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The purpose of this thesis is to explore in what direction President Putin is 
attempting to drive the Russian economy.  Now that Russia is past its initial transition 
phase, this thesis addresses the question of whether or not Russia has the necessary 
elements in place to ensure its success as a market economy.  In order to answer this 
question this thesis considers the roots of economic change within Russia, starting with 
the Gorbachev era.  The rule of law is also explored and how it affects the stability of the 
Russian market.  The Yukos case is used to serve as a marker for the establishment of the 
rule of law as it transcends all eras starting with Gorbachev and culminating under Putin.  
The main argument is that President Putin inherited a state rife with corruption and 
controlled by a select few who would steer the economy in order to further their own self-
interest.  Even though Putin was constrained by the legacy of the past, he has taken 
actions to counter corruption and keep Russia on the path of economic reform through 
‘managed capitalism.’  However, he has fallen short of building the institutions necessary 
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The purpose of this thesis is to explore in what direction President Putin is 
attempting to drive the Russian economy.  Now that Russia is past its initial transition 
phase, this thesis addresses the question of whether or not Russia has the necessary 
elements in place in order to ensure its success as a market economy.  In order to answer 
this question I consider the roots of economic change within Russia, starting with the 
Gorbachev era.  The rule of law is also explored and how it affects the stability of the 
Russian market.  The Gorbachev era is an essential starting point in order to effectively 
map out the types of economic systems and which of their elements were passed from 
Gorbachev to Yeltsin and finally to Putin.  By mapping out each system, the reader 
should gain a greater understanding for exactly what Putin has had to work with and 
whether or not he is dedicated to further developing a market economy within Russia, as 
well as the role that the rule of law plays in transitions to a market economy.  I argue that 
President Putin inherited a state rife with corruption and controlled by a select few who 
would steer the economy in order to further their own self-interest.  Considering the hand 
he was dealt, he had the difficult task of overcoming Russia’s volatile political and 
economic climate present at the beginning of the century.  I also argue that in order for 
Putin to develop a transparent market economy and ensuring Russia’s place in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), he must develop viable economic institutions and a state that 




The first chapter of this thesis will examine the Gorbachev era.  The specific 
questions that will be looked at are: what type of system did Gorbachev inherit from the 
Soviets?  How did this system affect the types of decisions he made with regards to 
shaping the Soviet economy?  And how did these decisions lay the ground work for the 
Russian economic transition?  The second chapter will then examine the transition that 
occurred under Yeltsin.  The questions that will be addressed are: what did Yeltsin do 
2 
with the system that he inherited from Gorbachev?  What methods were implemented to 
privatize the Russian economy?  To what extent did ‘shock therapy’ pave the way for 
corruption to infiltrate all aspects of the Russian political system?  And how did this 
system allow for the birth of a new elite class of businessmen and politicians called the 
oligarchs?  The third chapter will focus on Putin’s presidency during the years 2000 
through December, 2004.  It will answer the questions of: what types of systems were in 
place when Putin became president?  Is Putin attempting to establish a transparent free-
market economy that abides by the rule of law or is he attempting to control the market 
through political means?  What steps did Putin take to clean up the corrupt economic 
system?  What are the effects of his decisions?  Given the constraints what type of 
economy is Putin capable of creating?  Should we expect more? 
In order to better illustrate the central elements of the Soviet and Russian 
economic systems, I will use the rise and fall of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos to 
exemplify the arguments made throughout the thesis.  The reason for using the 
Khodorkovsky case is that it transcends all eras and culminates under Putin’s regime.  
During the Gorbachev era, Khodorkovsky was a product of the Soviet system who 
demonstrated a deep understanding of the intricacies of the system and how that system 
could be manipulated in order to further his own interests.  Under Yeltsin, 
Khodorkovsky’s shrewd way of handling business ventures allowed him to become one 
of the richest men in Russia.  Once Putin came into office, Khodorkovsky was well on his 
way to becoming Russia’s wealthiest man as his oil company Yukos produced two 
percent of the world’s total oil production.  Khodorkovsky continued to show his 
flexibility as he came to see the value of making Yukos more transparent to western 
investors.  In 2001, Yukos was one of the first companies to pay dividends on its stocks 
and at its height was valued at over thirty billion dollars.1  Khodorkovsky and Yukos 
appeared to be the model for other Russian companies to follow. 
However in 2003, Yukos became the target of the state as the oil company was 
investigated for tax evasion.  In October 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested and charged 
for fraud and tax evasion.  His arrest would raise questions surrounding the true reason 
                                                 
1 “YUKOS announces new dividend policy and interim dividend of USD 100 million,” Press Release 
Moscow, October 26, 2000, http://www.yukos.com/new_ir/Press_releases.asp, accessed March 2005. 
3 
behind Khodorkovsky’s arrest.  Some of these questions centered on whether or not this 
was an isolated incident or if Yukos marked the start of further investigations into other 
industries that were privatized during the 1990s.  Others questioned the state’s motives 
and its implications with regards to foreign direct investment (FDI).  The Yukos case will 
be used as an example for examining the steps that Putin has taken towards building the 
Russian economy and the consequences of those actions. 
The primary sources of information used are the work of academics and their 
analysis of the Russian economy.  Other sources include analysis by economists, 




Since taking the reins four years ago, Putin has shifted the direction of the 
economy since its development under Yeltsin.  When Putin became president he was 
faced with several challenges.  The Russian economy was dominated by an elite class 
that worked primarily to further their own self interests.  The economy was also rife with 
corruption from the top down, the rule of law was almost completely absent, and the 
institutions that were necessary to ensure a viable market economy were exceedingly 
weak or absent.  Putin had the daunting task of creating the market institutions that would 
allow Russia to transition to a transparent market economy.  He was also faced with 
getting a handle on Russia’s rampant corruption.  At first it seemed that Putin was 
creating a ‘managed democracy,’ however, it now appears that he is actually creating a 
system for ‘managed capitalism.’  Putin’s actions in the strategic placement of those loyal 
to him in positions of power within the energy sector and his pursuit of Khodorkovsky 
and Yukos serve as examples of how far Putin was willing to go in order to regain control 
of the state. 
The Yukos case encapsulates all of the challenges that Russia has faced in its 
transition in that: it grew from the dubious privatization schemes of the 1990s; it 
corresponded with a lack of transparency as minority shareholders were locked out of key 
meetings and decisions; it was a venue for corruption as Khodorkovsky stripped Yukos 
4 
of its assets and sold them for profit; and it served as a catapult for Russia’s energy sector 
to dominate economic growth.  The Yukos case also serves as a marker for the 
establishment and enforcement of the rules governing the market, and their equal 
application.  It raises questions by economists, politicians, and analysts about the 
Kremlin’s actions with regards to the rule of law.  The Yukos case also has foreign 
investors confused: should they sell Russian energy stocks because the country’s largest 
oil company has been made bankrupt in violation of shareholder’s rights, or should they 
buy assets because foreign companies are moving in?  Even though the measures that 
Putin has taken to regain control of the state may seem extreme, this thesis will show that 
Putin’s actions are necessary in order to develop a viable market economy.  However, he 
has fallen short of building the institutions necessary to create a transparent market 
economy.  The next chapter serves to lay the groundwork for evaluating the roots of 
Russian economic reform and its challenges by analyzing the Gorbachev era. 
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II. ECONOMIC REFORM PART I – THE GORBACHEV ERA 
All the attempts at partial reform – and there were any number of them – 
suffered failure one after the other.  The country lost its vision of the 
future.  It was impossible to live like that any longer.  What was needed 
was a radical change.   That is why I never, ever regretted not taking 
advantage of the post of general secretary merely to reign for a number of 
years.  I would have viewed that as irresponsible and amoral.  I realized 
that it was an extremely difficult and even risky business to begin reforms 
on that sort of scale and in our sort of society.  Even today I am convinced 
of the historical correctness of the democratic reforms begun in the spring 
of 1985.2 
Mikhail Gorbachev 
The burden of being a world superpower and the continuous head to head military 
competition with the United States contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union.  In the 
early 1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev took office he was soon to discover the full extent 
of the strain the military complex put on the economy.  As the Cold War became 
increasingly more technology based, the Soviet system was quickly finding itself being 
left behind as its archaic industries were unable to keep up with the American military 
machine.  Funding the Soviet military was taking as much as 16.5 percent of the total 
national product and 20 percent of GDP.3  Some sources have even placed GDP 
allocation as high as 30 percent of GDP to military production.4  The Soviet economy 
could no longer handle the strain and what was to follow was something that no one 
would have predicted to happen: the great Soviet machine came crashing down, leaving 
the once feared Soviet state in shambles. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the roots of economic reform within 
Russia, specifically during the time of Gorbachev’s reign as the general secretary of the 
Soviet Union.  The main question this chapter looks at is what type of economic system 
                                                 
2 “Gorbachev Resigns as USSR President,” FBIS-SOV-91-248, (26 December 1991), 20-21, quoted in 
Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia, (New York: Pearson Education, Inc. 2004), 49. 
3 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Chapter 6: The New Thinking Comes to Power, 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/english/CH-06.pdf, accessed January 2005. 
4 Evegniy Primakov, “Russia Must Be a Star Player in the World Arena,” speech, March 14, 1998, 10. 
The 30 percent figure represents the high end of CIA estimates. 
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Gorbachev inherited, what its constraints were and how his reforms laid the groundwork 
for the privatization of the 1990s.  In order to answer this question, I briefly examine the 
nature of the Soviet economic system.  I then analyze how the Soviet system affected the 
decisions that Gorbachev made with regards to economic reform.  Finally, I will discuss 
how these reforms were used as stepping stones for the Soviet Union’s eventual demise 
and laid the groundwork for Russia’s movement towards the development of a market 
economy. 
 
A. GORBACHEV’S INHERITANCE 
 
Vladimir Lenin’s vision of socialism encompassed a state that ran all forms of 
production; from agriculture to education and industry, nothing operated in private hands, 
and the Communist Party was designed to act in the interest of the people.5  The 
communists’ long range goal was to overthrow capitalism and establish a socialist system 
worldwide.6  In order to reach this goal, Lenin and later Joseph Stalin worked through 
several models that involved the centralization of the economy.  These models included 
the Five Year Plans.7  Within each model was a plan for collectivization of industry and 
agriculture.  The belief was that by bringing both under a centralized control system, 
more goods could be produced in a more cost effective manner.  Had the socialist model 
operated in its pure form, controlling the ownership structure, and all of the control and 
cash flow rights that were to go with it, the allocation of resources may have remained in 
balance.8  However, there was one serious flaw with the socialist model – the Communist 
party itself.  It was up to the Communist party officials and their ministers to decide 
production levels, prices, levels of investment, wages, et cetera.9  Nothing was left to 
                                                 
5 Thomas Remington, Politics in Russia, 3rd Edition (New York: Pearson Longman, 2004), 31. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For an in depth description of these plans, please see Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of 
Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 139-272. 
8 For a detailed account of control rights and cash flow rights under Stalin see Boycko, Shleifer and 
Vishney, Privatizing Russia, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 33-38. 
9 See Blanchard, Boycko, Dabrowski, Dornbusch, Layard, Schleifer, Post Communist Reform: Pain 
and Progress, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 40. 
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chance, creative thought was crushed and the welfare of the average Soviet citizen was 
not a concern to the party officials. 
Seweryn Bialer’s examination of the intricacies of the Soviet command economy 
and its model for economic growth as described below provides a good background in 
order to better understand its elements and features.  The state, which ultimately meant 
the Communist Party leadership, owned and controlled the economy.  Land, mineral 
resources, factories, banks, commerce, foreign trade were all nationalized; each was 
controlled by a state monopoly.10  The monopolies included governmental organs such as 
Gossnab (the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply) and Gostroi (the State 
Committee for Construction) which carried out distribution of resources, while 
Goskomtsen (the State Committee for Prices), Gosstandart (the State Committee for 
Standards), and Gosbank (the State Bank) provided the framework within which the 
economy functioned.11  The Communist leadership’s major aim was its commitment to 
economic growth.  Growth was oriented by goals, which were dictated not by the 
invisible hand of the market but by the visible hand of the state.12 
While economic growth was an ambition of the Communist leadership, economic 
criteria for growth were a low-ranking consideration.  What should grow, how fast and at 
what cost were all decided according to political criteria – in other words, in response to 
the goals of the leadership.13  The operation of the economy was highly centralized, and 
was supervised by a giant bureaucracy organized along vertical lines of authority.  The 
management of the primary units of production and services had very little freedom to 
decide what to do and how to do it.  This, of course, is in complete contrast to Western 
market economies.14  The specific objectives of economic development were selective; 
the aim was not balanced growth.  A relatively narrow range of high-priority tasks, such 
as military goals, were supplied with the necessary resources.  Production and 
                                                 
10 Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1987), 6. 
11 Mark A. Cichock, Russian and Eurasian Politics, (New York: Pearson Education, Inc. 2003), 158. 




distribution of consumer goods made do with the leftovers.  Thus the Soviet Union was a 
major military power, but its people had a standard of living inferior to that in the west.15 
The command planning of economic growth was extremely taut.  Overambitious 
goals were calculated to bring forth the maximum expenditure of effort and energy.  The 
economic reserves left for the element of the unexpected in planning for the future were 
very limited.16  Economic growth in the command economy depended primarily on 
massive and steadily increasing inputs of labor and capital – or in other words, on 
extensive growth.  The rise of labor productivity, innovations and diffusion of new 
technology – that is to say, intensive development, which was crucial to the West – had 
been of distinctly secondary importance in expanding the command economy.17  The 
directors of the command economy attached critical importance to quantitative indices of 
achievement.  Their incentive system was geared largely to promote higher outputs, far 
more than higher quality or lower costs.  The managers of microeconomic units knew 
that they would have been severely punished for not fulfilling their quotas.  They and 
their workers also realized that they would get away with shortcomings in quality, 
diversity and costs.18  The incentive was to produce more but not better products.  The 
money supply, price mechanism, and credit – were absent or feeble.  At best they 
performed an imperfect and artificial accounting function for the directors of the 
economy.  There was no such thing as consumer sovereignty.  Russians could not choose 
among competing brands.  They had to take what the state offered or do without.19  The 
Stalinist model of growth and the command economy were designed to be operated in 
virtual isolation from the outside world.  After Stalin’s death this total isolation was 
pierced.  But even as late as the early 1980s, Soviet dependence on the world market was 
marginal.20 
                                                 




19 Ibid., 7. 
20 Ibid. 
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With the state guiding the direction of the economy, innovation through 
competition was  non-existent,  and the state itself becomes a monopoly.  Valerie Bunce 
argues that by effectively removing boundaries between the political, economic, and 
social sectors set the Soviet command economy apart from other socialist models.  She 
also argues that; 
state socialism managed to erase not just the already noted boundaries 
between politics and economics, but also a series of other boundaries that 
are central to most other political-economic systems; that is, the 
boundaries separating the public from the private, the state from civil 
society and the regime from the state. This meant that the public sphere 
swallowed up the private; civil and political society was either destroyed 
or prevented from developing; and the state was intertwined with, and 
quite dependent upon, the regime. When combined, these traits had one 
core consequence: the governing party in these dictatorships functioned 
simultaneously as an economic, political and social monopoly. These 
parties had no economic, political or social competitors, and they were 
guaranteed – through their monopolistic position and their institutional 
reach – ready access to economic, political and social resources.21 
With the state functioning as a monopoly, the state can become inefficient 
because it prevents the economy from producing the mix of products that have the 
greatest possible value and quality.22  Soviet industry did grow under its own version of 
socialism, but it was not without consequences, especially when one considers its impact 
on innovation, quality and efficiency.  The command economy was developed and 
refined during the late 1920s and early 30s as Stalin pushed through the first of the Five 
Year Plans, which were designed to industrialize the Soviet Union quickly and move 
resources rapidly.23  In order to achieve this, as was argued by Bialer, the command 
economy put more emphasis on quantity and rewarded managers for meeting quotas. 
In this type of environment there is little incentive for improving on the quality of 
products produced.  One could argue that incentives for reaching quotas could be used to 
                                                 
21 Valerie Bunce, “The Collapse of Socialism, the Soviet Bloc and Socialist States: An Institutional 
Account,” working papers for Research Group in International Security, 
http://www.ciaonet.org.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/wps/buv01/buv01.html, accessed April 2005. 
22 Robert Schenk, “Overview Efficiency and Monopoly,” Saint Joseph’s College, Indiana 1998, 
http://www.saintjoe.edu, accessed April 2005. 
23 Gregory Grossman, “Notes for a Theory of the Command Economy,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2. 
(Oct. 1963), 107, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-
5859%28196310%2915%3A2%3C101%3ANFATOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U, accessed April 2005. 
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push innovation through to the production lines, but the opposite was generally the 
outcome.  Rather than using the incentives to improve on quality of production, managers 
often took short-cuts which made the factories a dangerous place to work and had other 
serious consequences including: a rise in industrial pollution, lack of quality housing, 
long working hours, scarce food supplies, and in many cases families were forced to 
share cramped unsanitary quarters.24 
Another consequence of the Soviet command economy was the development of a 
shadow economy within the economy itself.  This new or second economy was known as 
the black market or underground.25  All private business activity was against the law and 
if caught operating a private business the person would be charged with an economic 
crime.  Even though the punishment of such a crime could result in death, many were 
willing to run the risk.  The types of enterprises these black marketeers engaged in 
included the sale of banned foreign and black market goods, currency speculation, and 
private services and repairs.26  The shadow economy existed to meet the needs of factory 
managers and consumers that the state was not fulfilling.  There were even cases of 
factory managers who would hire a tolkatch (a “pusher” or “expeditor”), who would 
arrange for goods and deliveries “off the books,” when the state Ministries would fail to 
deliver promised materials.27  The black market which permeated Soviet society until the 
fall of the Soviet Union was conducted in such a manner that payments for goods were 
made partly through cash and partly through political favors.28 
Those that were successful in the Soviet underground were eventually able to use 
their skills to their advantage during the mass privatization of the 1990s.  By 1991, 
“central planning was dead, as were its controlling and decision-making institutions, 
Gosplan, Gossnab, and the ministries.  Store shelves were empty.  In such near anarchic 
conditions, those who had developed skills searching out and selling scarce supplies had 
                                                 
24 James Wilkinson, H. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe, (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2004), 
251. 
25 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 207. 




an enormous advantage.”29  While most of society had no idea how to function in a 
market economy, as they had been under centralized control for over seven decades, 
black marketeers were able to amass fortunes in the scale of billions of dollars. 
In addition to the development of a shadow economy, inefficiencies of production 
would permeate the system and reasonable levels of economic growth were not able to be 
maintained.30  This would cause the Soviet Union to experience zero economic growth 
by 1982.31  The need to correct these inefficiencies was one of the contributing factors 
which lead to Gorbachev’s economic reforms, including the 1986 creation of 
Gosagroprom (the State Agro-Industrial Committee).32  Gorbachev was not the only 
Soviet leader who attempted to restructure the bureaucratic apparatus for the sake of 
efficiency; Khrushchev attempted to implement his ‘economics over politics’ reform in 
1962.33  His reforms, coupled later with Brezhnev’s political policies, would provide an 
outline for the Communist Party that would retain the basic Leninist tenets of state 
ownership of production and keep the Party as the source of political direction for the 
state and society.34 
Another consequence came in the form of weak institutionalized power; as 
Stalin’s political authority was heavily dependent on fear.35  Stalin’s power during his 
reign was almost absolute and his death, in 1953, brought confusion as to how a 
successor would be chosen, as there were no set rules or procedures for transferring 
power.36  His death also came with the challenge of redefining the institutional 
framework for ruling the state.  The goal of his successors was to strengthen 
institutionalized power by substituting Stalin’s extreme method of rule and replacing it 
                                                 
29 Goldman, 125. 
30 Bunce. 
31 English, 195. 
32 Malia, 408-409. 
33 Cichock. 
34 Remington, 34. 
35 Ibid., 31. 
36 Ibid., 34. 
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with one that was more rules-governed, with the power of the Party exercised more 
collectively.37 
During Khrushchev’s reign, he attempted to rally the working class and bind them 
once again to the Party in an effort to move away from Stalinism.  In order to achieve 
this, he proposed a “mixture of an ideological communist vision and ‘goulash 
communism’ – pay incentives – that was to be combined with efforts at enhancing 
popular participation in communal affairs in order to give the working classes a greater 
stake in economic progress.”38  While able to moderate the effects of Stalinism, 
Khrushchev failed in his attempt to make a complete shift as his colleagues considered 
his reforms to be dangerous, and eventually ousted him in October of 1964.39 
While Khrushchev’s attempt to move the Party away from Stalinism would lead 
to his downfall, the popularity of Brezhnev’s rule within the political elite showed the 
continuing vitality of Stalinist modes of thinking and management regarding the 
economy.40  Brezhnev’s reign saw little to no attempts at reforms that would upset the 
balance of ministerial and regional power centers and very little change to policy with 
regards to innovation.41  In the beginning of his reign lack of innovation had little effect 
on the economy; in fact, during the first decade of his rule, the Soviet Union experienced 
good overall growth and increased consumption.42  However, this growth did not last and 
by the early 1980s, the growth rate would flatten out to zero.  Other results included “a 
drift in policy, worsening government performance, and a gradual aging of the entire 
ruling elite of the Soviet Union, during which the political system grew increasingly 
unresponsive to the imperative of economic and political reform.”43 
Unresponsiveness to economic and political reform, inefficiencies within the 
economic sector, increasing military burdens, and the rise of nationalistic ideologies 
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within the Soviet Union would all be contributing factors that led to Gorbachev’s reform 
movement.  Brezhnev successors Andropov and Chernenko were both in office for too 
short a period to put forth any real changes.  Although Andropov initially pushed for 
reform, Chernenko maintained the status quo of Brezhnev’s policies.  It would not be 
until Gorbachev took office that reform would again be mentioned, although no one 
could predict the extent to which Gorbachev’s reforms would impact the economy.  Some 
have even questioned whether or not Gorbachev realized the extent that his reforms 
would lead to the end of the Soviet Union or if the ‘solidarity movement’ took him by 
surprise.  This question is beyond the scope of this thesis and I will not address it further 
except to say that I would argue that it appears that Gorbachev’s reforms were at the very 
least an attempt to save the socialist command economy, at the very most an attempt to 
create a socialist democracy, but certainly not an overt act to dismantle the system. 
 
B. GORBACHEV’S REFORMS 
 
By the time Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev took office as general secretary he 
had already stated, in a speech in December 1984, his intent to reform the command 
economy.  While the speech could not be considered extremist in nature, he used broad 
brush strokes to paint a picture that supported reform in order to strengthen the Soviet 
Union.  He attacked the Brezhnev doctrine, introduced the ideas of glasnost (openness) 
and perestroika (restructuring), as well as concepts and ideas that other political groups 
could support.  For example, he spoke of anti-corruption elements that the Puritans could 
relate to, he favored rationalizing the planned economy to gain support of the technocrats, 
and his overall reform ideas captured the ideas of political reformists.44  The most 
striking aspect of the speech was that while it spoke of reform, it was not so radical as to 
scare the hard core Brezhnev loyalists who were willing to tolerate some reform in the 
interest of strengthening socialism.45  As was stated before, the need for reform came 
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from a variety of factors including the stagnation of the Soviet economy, as inefficiencies 
within the system continued to grow. 
When Gorbachev finally took over the office of the general secretary, he would 
embark on a path of reform.  Bialer categorizes Gorbachev’s reforms into four areas; one, 
to change the managerial and administrative personnel and their reeducation; two, to 
increase labor discipline; three, reduce central planning and emphasize quality and cost; 
and four, the centralized mobilization of resources for essential goals.46  For Gorbachev 
to enact these reforms he had to overcome the constraints of the command economy. 
First, I will discuss his attempts to change the managerial and administrative 
personnel within the state.  Gorbachev’s attempts to change the bureaucracy would mean 
a top-down reorganization of the system.  It would also mean circumventing the elite 
power structure that maintained the Party.47  Bunce argues that the Party elites were the 
sole provider of power and privilege within the system, which meant that the Party 
functioned as the market for all claims to power and privilege.48 
The Party elites were unusually "elite sensitive," because the system was 
composed of-indeed defined by-an elaborate tapestry of dependent 
relationships that ran from its bottom (local neighborhoods, schools, and 
the like) to its apex in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the 
communist party. Thus, if the elites were stable, so was economics, 
politics, power and personnel.49 
The elite power structure is the very entity that brought Gorbachev to power and it 
was the same structure that he, in some cases, circumvented or successfully negotiated in 
order to push his reforms through.50  The issue with relying on an elite power structure in 
this manner is that it can create a significant amount of conflict up and down the structure 
itself.  Conflict arose as members at various levels constantly jockeyed for a favorable 
position or to gain a valuable connection within the Party hierarchy, which would lead to 
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privileges that could not have been had without the connection.51  It could be said that 
Gorbachev used conflict among the elites to his advantage, in that there was already an 
underlying movement of ‘new thinkers’ that were ready to challenge the Soviet model of 
a command economy.52  The ‘new thinkers’ arose from a growing number of intellectuals 
that had various experiences with Western policies and ideologies which would further 
influence Gorbachev’s plans for glasnost and perestroika.53  However, even with the 
intellectual elite on his side Gorbachev would still face resistance to his reforms.  The 
resistance came from the conservative right within the Party in that they were generally 
not ready to deal with the social consequences of ending consumer subsidies and other 
forms of dependence on the state sector.54  To take away the crutch of state subsidies 
could be later interpreted as a flaw when evaluating the effects of Gorbachev’s reforms.  
As far as Gorbachev’s efforts to restructure the political system, he pushed for changes to 
the Soviet constitution, legal system, party rules, and even introduced the idea for 
democratization.  By 1989, it could be said that not much was changed in that after four 
years of reforms the Communist Party still dominated the political system.  However, as 
Francis Fukuyama argues, what did change within the Party was its ideology, in that 
some Party members recognized that the root cause of Soviet inefficiency was central 
planning and the command system itself.55 
As far as the other three categories of Gorbachev’s reforms, they could all be 
equated to the economic structure itself.  The targets of Gorbachev’s reforms would be 
labor, investment and prices.  He pushed an agenda for developing a market economy and 
decentralizing the decision making.  He drew from Lenin’s experiment of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) to push economic liberalization.  Laws authorized the 
Komsomol (Youth Communist League) to develop cooperatives and individual work 
activities, which amounted to the legalization of private enterprise.  Under the guise of 
the mini NEP, Gorbachev looked to the Komsomol for potential entrepreneurs who could 
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test the potential for developing a market economy within Russia.  Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky was an example of who was selected to conduct the Russian market 
experiment.  While studying economics at the Mendeleeva Chemical Technical Institute, 
Khodorkovsky was the deputy chief of the Komsomol and had the connections necessary 
to maneuver through the political bureaucracy.  He used his connections and created a 
youth club (Foundation of Youth Initiative), “that was in reality a nascent business under 
the protective umbrella of the Komsomol.”56  Gorbachev pushed a few new initiatives 
that would allow the young entrepreneurs a greater freedom to really test the system. 
On December 28, 1987, the central committee of the Komsomol gave its 
local organizations a new set of financial rules, allowing them to raise and 
spend money as they pleased and set up their own bank accounts … One 
of the rules was extremely significant: Komsomol organizations could, in 
certain cases, mix the nalichnye [cash] and beznalichnye [non-cash].57 
David Hoffman in his book The Oligarchs gives an in depth description of how 
Khodorkovsky was able to take advantage of Gorbachev’s reforms.  Hoffman even 
admits that not all of the avenues are known as to how Khodorkovsky was able to 
manipulate the system, as there are few people who are willing to talk about his scheme 
for turning non-cash into cash.  It is assumed higher-ups in the Komsomol turned a blind 
eye to his dealings and that the central bank actually helped him out.  Khodorkovsky was 
able to manipulate Gorbachev’s reforms and create a lucrative business of creating cold 
hard cash from beznalichnye – virtual money that the government used to subsidize 
factories.  Non-cash was virtually worthless and could not be mixed with real cash or 
nalichnye.  Factories would pay Khodorkovsky and his fellow technical experts for their 
help on technical issues with the government subsidies.  The subsidies in the past were 
not allowed to be used as a cash payment for goods or services, yet under the new rule; if 
the factories were dealing with businesses affiliated with Komsomol they could use the 
non-cash as payment.  Khodorkovsky would then shift the funds through his channels 
within the banking sector and turn it into dollars.  In the end, Gorbachev’s reforms 
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created an avenue for many young money hungry young people to become very wealthy 
prior to the fall of the Soviet Union.  
While the Komsomol experiment was an attempt to develop a market, Malia 
argues that while Gorbachev called for decentralization he was not advocating giving up 
socialist property.  By keeping industry under state control, Gorbachev did little more 
than advocate long term leases; and his economic reforms, though radical by Soviet 
standards, were not revolutionary.58  For example, in June 1987, he endorsed a draft Law 
on State Enterprises, which sought to free industry from the direct control of Gosplan and 
the central ministries which meant that profits could be used according to how the 
managers saw fit, whether for increased wages or investment.  Yet, by January 1988 
when the program was to be implemented the overall socialist plan and ministries 
remained, so the reform remained a hybrid and not a full reform change.59 
Yet the “old system was given a shock, and a space for individual initiative had 
been created that would prove increasingly difficult to control.”60  This aspect was 
exemplified when Gorbachev stripped his ministers of various control rights including 
appointing managers, implementing production plans and determining inputs into the 
industry.  These control rights were transferred to the managers without the benefit of 
controlling the cash flow rights.  This meant that the managers could seek to maximize 
their personal profit through diversion of assets and outputs; this in turn could lead to the 
disruption of supply chains as managers sold directly to the black market and the state no 
longer controlled the flow goods.  The Communist Party lost control of the managers as 
they “refused to obey instructions from Moscow.”61  This would later become crucial as 
by 1989, Gorbachev would separate the judiciary from Party control while not 
establishing a formal rule of law.62  It was not that the Party was against establishing a 
rule of law.  On the contrary, both the soviets and the Party were to transform the Soviet 
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Union into a “socialist state based on the rule of law.”63  The issue that could not be 
resolved was how to do this when the Party essentially functioned above the law.  It 
appeared that the Party was not capable of such a transformation, and would that to 
subject it to the law would mean the Party tearing it apart.  By not developing institutions 
toward establishing a formal rule of law, managers were forced to rely on their 
connections both within the Party and the black market to ensure contracts were enforced.  
The intricacies of these connections and the roots of corruption within Russia will be 
discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
 
C. THE AFTERMATH 
 
Gorbachev initiated perestroika and glasnost as a means of reforming the Soviet 
economy that was in serious decline as a repercussion of its superpower status.64  By the 
winter of 1989 it became clear that the Soviet Union was in a serious crisis.  It started 
with the extreme scarcity of goods, then exchange degenerated into barter, and finally the 
country broke up into local economic units.65  The government responded to the crisis in 
the spring of 1990 by preparing plans for a Soviet version of the Polish model of radical 
economic transition.66  Another phenomenon occurred, what Malia terms a “revolution of 
consciousness,” which meant the end of Soviet socialism.  This revolution called for 
developing a “base for civil society in personal property and freedom of economic 
choice,”67 which is a far cry from the Soviet model that had been adhered to for decades. 
By 1990, Gorbachev’s reforms had severe consequences to the economy.  The 
first was fiscal and monetary imbalances that were caused by reduced production and 
consumer shortages.  The second consequence was the acceleration of inflation that was 
caused by the Law of State Enterprises which effectively destroyed the vertical chain of 
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command without “creating the channels for horizontal exchange among producers, 
distributors, and consumers that were necessary for a market economy.”68  As goods 
disappeared from store shelves, Gorbachev and the ‘new thinkers’ worked on several 
models to save the dying Soviet economy.  There was talk of a “regulated market 
economy.”  At the beginning of 1990 Grigorii Yavlinski produced a plan for shock 
therapy marketization and privatization, but this was turned down by Gorbachev.69  In 
August of 1990, Gorbachev teamed up with Yeltsin and came up with the 500-Day plan. 
The 500-Day Plan had three provisions that stood out; first, there was to be a massive 
sale of government assets to soak up monetary overhang; second, the rapid introduction 
of the market in conjunction with large scale privatization, and finally, it delegated to the 
republics the power of taxation as well as control over their natural resources.70  When 
Gorbachev realized that implementing the plan would mean the demise of the Soviet 
system he immediately began to back-peddle, called for maintaining the status quo, and 
set out to bury the 500-Day Plan.  Unfortunately it was too late; he had set the wheels in 
motion and could not stop what was about to happen.  Despite all his efforts to ‘save’ the 
Soviet system, it would be all for naught as the Soviet Empire came crashing down. 
The 500-Day Plan would be resurrected by Yeltsin following the August coup.  
The plan would be later shelved in favor of a more radical policy of “shock therapy” 
price liberalization that would be carried out by Yegor Gaidor, the prime minister.71  This 
and Russia’s path to privatization will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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III. ECONOMIC REFORM PART II – THE YELTSIN ERA 
The reformists had their work cut out for them as the social, political, and legal-
fiduciary controls had collapsed with the Soviet Union’s break-up.  With very little 
formal institutions in place and the need to quickly establish a free market economy, the 
paths to privatization that were chosen made it easy for corruption to come to the 
forefront and infiltrate the system at all levels, as well as give rise to a new class of 
millionaires called the oligarchs.  This chapter will explore the nature of post-Soviet Era 
privatization; the establishment of a pseudo-liberal market economy; and will provide the 
background of how Khodorkovsky was able to amass billions during the late 1990s.  It 
will address the questions of: What did Yeltsin do with the system that he inherited from 
Gorbachev?  What methods were implemented to privatize the Russian economy?  To 
what extent did ‘shock therapy’ pave the way for corruption to infiltrate all aspects of the 
Russian political system?  And how did this system allow for the birth of a new elite class 
of businessmen and politicians called the oligarchs? 
 
A. YELTSIN’S INHERITANCE 
 
Some analysts argue that Gorbachev’s original intent with regards to reform was 
to save the Soviet Union.  Under the influence of the ‘new thinkers,’ Gorbachev along 
with his intellectual advisors, eventually pushed for democratic reform within the Union.  
Gorbachev’s idea for glasnost opened the door for Russia to ask for outside assistance 
from the West, an idea that was unheard of during the Soviet era.  By 1991 the Soviet 
economy was in a virtual tailspin, Soviet GDP had declined 17 percent and continued to 
decline at an accelerated rate, Soviet debt increased appreciably, and inflation rose at an 
alarming rate.72  When Boris Yeltsin came to power, his intentions were fairly clear.  
Rather than save the Soviet Union, he intended to bury it through privatization and 
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democratization.73  Historically, privatization has contributed to the socio-economic and 
political prosperity of a nation, although not without a few failures.74  Privatization, in 
some cases, is thought to promote economic stability, democracy, and social stability by 
reducing the power of centralized government and granting it to the ordinary people.75  It 
also can encourage competition which results in better products and customer service, 
whereas state-run economies tend to be inefficient and bureaucratic.76  For western 
economies the development of a transparent market did not happen overnight, yet that is 
precisely what Russia was attempting to do through economic ‘shock therapy’ (the policy 
of rapid transition to capitalism).77  But was the Post-Soviet economy ready for modern 
day capitalism?  The answer to that question could be both yes and no. 
It has been argued that Russia was in dire need to break free from the centralized 
communist system and kick start its economy, but it lacked some of the basic institutions 
that were in place within western market economies.  The institutions that were lacking in 
Russia included those specified and enforced by the government through a formal rule of 
law, as well as informal institutions that are generated by having a developed civil 
society.78  Yoshiko Herrera argues that economic reform is dependent on political 
reform, and that to focus solely on market forces will lead to inadequacies in economic 
reform.79  Relying solely on market forces was exactly what the reformers did.  They 
relied on the assumption that institutions would come about in their own time, rather than 
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taking the time to push institutional reforms as well as economic reforms.80  Within the 
centralized economic structure of the Soviet Union, institutions existed under the state 
monopolies.  It was apparent that the reformers wanted to avoid any influence from the 
state, yet the state should have taken over the role of coordinating public and private 
institutions that are necessary for a market economy to function.  Herrera brought forth 
the argument from five Nobel laureates – K. Arrow, L. Klein, W. Leontief, R. Solow, and 
J. Tobin – to support this claim. 
They argued that this role would involve government support for 
restructuring and the establishment of market institutions such as property 
rights, a stable currency, a legal system that could enforce laws and 
regulate newly privatized enterprises, and an enforceable, simplified tax 
system.  They also stated that many of Russia’s present economic troubles 
stemmed directly or indirectly from the fact that the government did not 
assume its proper role in a market economy.81 
Herrera and the Nobel laureates were not the only academics to point out Russia’s 
lack of democratic and market institutions as a cause of Russia’s difficult transition.  
Michael McFaul argued that the Yeltsin regime lacked a clear sense of what it was trying 
to create and that Yeltsin relied heavily on the advice of neoliberal economists.82  
Richard Ericson also argued that one of Russia’s obstacles for a successful transition was 
institutional, in that Russia’s weak institutions lacked a well-defined, protected property 
rights and a supporting legal infrastructure.83  Yeltsin’s naiveté with regards to institution 
building and state involvement in a market economy haunted his administration for the 
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B. PATH TO PRIVATIZATION 
 
In 1991, Yeltsin gathered together a group of young neoliberal economists, 
including Yegor Gaidar, to lay out a plan that would lead Russia down the path to a free 
market economy.  Gaidar apparently believed that Russia would be an ideal area for a 
market economy.  Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, deputy prime minister, “hoped that all 
the collectivism, passivity, paternalism, and destruction of initiative and entrepreneurship 
that was a legacy of Russian and Soviet history would melt away as a beachhead of free 
markets, free trade, private property, and free prices were established.”84  It was quite a 
hefty assumption of Gaidar and Chubais that they would be able to pull this off, 
considering that it had been more than seventy years since the Russian public had been 
able to think for itself and act on its initiatives. 
The Russian reforms resulted in increasing private properties and 
economic prosperity, with limited individual freedom.  Simultaneously, 
however, the transition created bureaucracy, powerful state-owned 
enterprises, lack of rule of law, and uncontrolled corruption.85 
As argued earlier, the key missing link, appropriate institutional structure, both 
formal and informal, were not in place when Russia began its reforms. 
Rather than focusing on building state institutions that would support the market 
economy, Gaidar and Chubais’s strategy focused solely on economic reforms, including 
removing price controls, pushing for macroeconomic stabilization, and privatizing state 
enterprises.86  In order to make this happen, they committed to “shock therapy” and 
created a voucher program to privatize the state’s assets.  They enlisted the aid of Andrei 
Shleifer, a Harvard economics professor, Maxim Boycko, a Russian economist, and 
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Robert Vishny, an economist at the University of Chicago, to help design the voucher 
program.87  They identified three main ideas for privatization:  
That people respond to incentives, that political influence is the 
fundamental economic problem of transition economies, and that the 
government owns nothing outright and hence the consent of all 
stakeholders is essential for successful reforms.”88 
Yeltsin sold the voucher privatization to the general populace under the guise that 
what “Russia needed was millions of owners rather than a handful of millionaires … the 
vouchers were a ticket for each of us to a free economy.”89  So in October 1992, 
individuals were able to acquire their vouchers from the state savings bank, Sberbank, for 
25 rubles.  The nominal value of the vouchers was 10,000 rubles.  The vouchers could 
then be either sold in the private market, invested in private investment funds, or used to 
bid for shares in companies.  The vouchers were tradable, thus allowing individuals to 
receive cash immediately and large investors to buy up large blocks of shares in voucher 
auctions.  By the end of 1993, 144 million vouchers had found their way into individual 
hands, and by the end of the voucher program 14,000 firms had been privatized.90  
However, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny relied on several flawed assumptions.  First, that 
Russian stockholders would act the same as American stockholders; and second, that they 
took for granted that the existence of property rights automatically guaranteed that the 
state and the society would enforce those rights.91  Without a formal rule of law, the 
Russian economy was ripe for corruption as it moved down the path to privatization. 
These assumptions would lead to the ruination of millions of Russians and the rise 
of a number of shrewd businessmen who would make millions at their expense.  Nothing 
could better exemplify this than the example of the MMM pyramid scheme.  David Satter 
gives a vivid account of the turmoil that followed in the wake of the MMM scandal in his 
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book Darkness at Dawn.  Zealous swindlers used the media to promote their voucher 
funds, which in some cases were merely companies attempting to buy their own shares.  
Others were simply fronts for dummy firms.  “From 1992 through 1994, 800 dummy 
firms defrauded nearly 30 million Russians of 140 trillion rubles in what became known 
as the theft of the century.”92  The Russian citizens could be forgiven for their ignorance 
as they were brought up under a Soviet system where principles of investing did not 
apply.  Russians easily believed the claims of these firms for huge returns on investments, 
as much as 1,000 to 10,000 percent, simply because it was on TV and in the newspapers.  
Unfortunately for many Russians, this only served to put a sour taste in their mouths 
when they saw their life-savings vanish almost overnight, as they only understood that 
the system was supposed to take care of them and now they had nothing but empty 
promises. 
 
C. THE RULING CLASS  
 
Without a rule of law in place, a small number of individuals were able to gain an 
advantage and become millionaires literally overnight.  They were able to do this by 
exploiting Russia’s natural resources, especially oil and natural gas.  The factories were 
practically free, and since most of the new owners rarely bothered to pay their employees 
or their bills on time, most of the revenue earned was pure profit.93  There were neither 
regulations that dealt specifically with private businesses, nor were there any competitors, 
so there were no limits to what these entrepreneurs could achieve.  However, the absence 
of state regulations meant that they had to fend for themselves against criminal and Mafia 
groups.94  Those that were able to succeed within the new environment became the new 
ruling class otherwise known as the oligarchs. 
There were three main categories of the new Russian oligarchs: former factory 
managers, former senior members of the communist-era nomenklatura, and those who 
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prior to 1987 were on the margin of Soviet society.95  The most common new oligarch 
was a former factory or business manager of the Soviet era.  They coerced their 
employees to give up their shares of stock “so that they could dominate the makeup of the 
board of directors.”96  Vladimir V. Kadannikov and Nikolai A. Pugin are prime examples 
of the converted factory director. 
The next category included former members of the nomenklatura. 
These officials arranged for the transformation of several state enterprises 
into non-state joint stock companies and then appointed themselves as 
managing officers…and gained control of Russia’s rich resource 
endowments, even though for a time at least the state retained a significant 
equity.  In some cases the state continued to be the controlling 
stockholder.”97 
This was the case of Russia’s primary natural gas company, Gazprom.  Examples 
of ex-nomenklatura from the raw material sector were Rem Vyakhirev and Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, and from the oil sector, Vladimir Bogdanov who took over 
Surgutneftegaz.  Vladimir O. Potanin worked in foreign trade and is the president and 
founder of Oneximbank.  From the banking sector arose Vladimir V. Vinogradov. 
The third category could be called the upstart oligarchs, as they tended to operate 
outside the law during the Soviet era.  In some cases they operated in the Soviet shadow 
economy; and in others, they exploited their contacts that they had developed within the 
Soviet system during the 1970s and 1980s.  Alexander P. Smolenski, Vladmir Gusinsky, 
Anatoly Chubais and Mikhail Khodorkovsky were among those able to use their contacts 
and become some of the wealthiest men in the world.98 
In other transition economies it is not unusual to have a business elite.  The 
Russian oligarchs were significantly different, not only in the way they achieved their 
status, but in the fact that they have significant influence in both the Russian economy as 
well as the government.  The power of the oligarchs could be seen in how they were able 
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to influence the June 1996 presidential campaign and manipulate the electorate into 
voting for Boris Yeltsin.  At the time, it appeared that Gennady Zyuganov, the 
Communist Party leader, would win the election, something the oligarchs were loath to 
see happen as they feared the return to a Soviet era style economy.99  Yeltsin showed his 
gratitude by allowing the oligarchs to carve up valuable raw materials, business and 
media outlets. 
By 1999, the Russian elite encompassed the majority of wealth throughout the 
country, 80-90 percent of the population was in dire straits, and 38 percent were below 
the official poverty line.100  The oligarchs were able to gain their status not only through 
their business savvy, but through the shady backroom deals of the ‘loans for shares’ 
program which Yeltsin enacted in 1996.  It is interesting to note that the ‘loans for shares’ 
program was originally outlined on March 30, 1995 by Vladimir Potanin, the head of 
Oneximbank, who would emerge as the biggest beneficiary of the program.101  The 
pretext behind the program was that bankers wanted to help the government reduce its 
deficit.  The government would put up collateral for loans, from the banker, in the form 
of government owned stock from larger companies the state was planning to sell.  If the 
loans were not repaid, the banks were free to sell the collateral to recoup their money.  
These were shares of stock that the state had intended to sell anyway.  The banks would 
then hold an auction on the state’s behalf to purchase the collateral. 
Correctly done, the companies would yield enough funds to repay the banks and 
generate for the state a considerably larger amount than the initial loan.  In actuality, the 
auctions were held in remote locations, with the seller setting the terms.  These auctions 
rarely generated more funds than the original loan, and the winner was almost always 
affiliated with the bank that held the auction.102  With no restraints or laws to regulate the 
newly privatized businesses or banks, corners were turned, rents were sought, eyes were 
blinked, assets stripped and favors rendered.103  It was through the loans for shares 
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program that Khodorkovsky was able to acquire Yukos.  By 1998, when Forbes 
Magazine released its list of the world’s wealthiest 200, for the first time it included five 
of the Russian oligarchs.104 
Does this mean that Russia was successful in its privatization efforts?  Just 
looking in terms of numbers of firms privatized, the answer would be yes.  But the point 
of privatization in the first place was to place the formerly state-owned assets in the 
hands of millions.  If you consider that 50% of GDP by 1999 was under the control of 
eleven oligarchs, the answer would be no. 
 
D. EFFECTS OF YELTSIN’S ECONOMIC REFORMS 
 
From 1991-1998, Yeltsin took the Russian Federation on a roller coaster ride as 
Russia transitioned from a communist centralized economy to a democratic market 
economy.  There were many obstacles that helped to complicate Russia’s reform.  These 
obstacles included: a decentralized political structure that created regional conflict; the 
concentration of raw materials in a few regions which created economic inequities; and a 
presidential structure that created a virulent constitutional struggle between parliament 
and presidency.105  Schleifer and Treisman argued that given the obstacles, Yeltsin’s 
reformers did make significant achievements during 1992 to 1998.106  While these 
achievements resulted in converting Russia to a market economy, Yeltsin’s reforms had 
many effects that directly impacted efficiency, investment, growth, corruption, and social 
welfare in Russia.  As was stated earlier, Russia’s ill-developed institutions continued to 
impact Yeltsin’s reforms through the 1990s.  When comparing Russian reform to that of 
the other Warsaw Pact countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, some analysts 
contend that the latter had somewhat of an easier time with their transition as they had old 
democratic institutions that were suspended while under authoritarian rule and simply 
                                                 
104 Goldman, 98. 
105 Schleifer and Treisman, Without a Map, 20. 
106 Ibid. 
30 
had to resurrect those institutions.107  Russia other the other hand did not and this had 
several significant impacts on the reform movement. 
One of the impacts was related to economic efficiency.  Russia’s issues with 
inefficiency dated back to the Soviet era, as was discussed in Chapter II, and this legacy 
would carry over through its reforms.  Yoshiko Herrera argues that there are two reasons 
why restructuring impacted efficiency.  First, despite the liberalization of prices and 
trade, there was a severe lack of investment.  Second, economic reforms were not 
established under competitive conditions and did not engender further rule-based 
competition.108  Without investment, there was no new capital to aid newly privatized 
firms in restructuring and streamlining their business, which resulted in decreased output 
and falling wages.  It would not be until 1998 when there would be a meager change in 
employment structure and minor layoffs.109  By not establishing a competitive market 
under rule-based competition, industries exercised monopolistic control over goods, and 
“the legal system did not protect or support the entry of new competitive firms.”110  One 
of the tenets of a market economy is that competition encourages innovation.  In Russia’s 
case, the lack of competition resulted in a decreased level of efficiency, already weak 
owing to the lack of innovation endemic to the Soviet command economy. 
Another impact of Yeltsin’s reforms was a low level of outside investment in 
Russia.  Herrera argues there are two reasons for this: one, the government’s inability to 
handle a policy that would produce an attractive investment climate, and two, the lack of 
legal infrastructure for protecting investment and property rights.111  The emphasis on 
stakeholder’s rights as well as a general lack of contract enforcement had a negative 
effect on foreign participation in investment.112  While Russia needed an influx of capital 
into its industry, there are mixed views as to where that capital should come from.  
Charles McPherson, an energy economist from the World Bank, argued in 1996 that joint 
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ventures within the oil sector between foreign and domestic interests saw modest 
increases in production and output as compared to those industries that did not engage in 
joint ventures.113  Gains in the energy sector can be attributed to the influx of capital 
from foreign investors.  On the other hand, Anders Aslund argues that foreign investment 
is not what would lead to a takeoff in the economy.  Rather exports and control of capital 
flight, which amounted to approximately $20 billion a year, are key factors that influence 
a successful market economy.114  Initially foreign direct investment (FDI) saw a 
significant increase during 1996 and 1997.  However, insecurity relating to protecting 
investment and property rights, as well as the financial crisis of 1998, were among the 
causes for the decrease in FDI, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
 



















Figure 1.   Russian Foreign Investment 1996 through 1999 (From “Russian Economy: 
Trends and Perspectives,” The Institute for the Economy in Transition, Issue 21.) 
 
Another issue that is a good indicator of the investment climate was the 
significant levels of capital flight during the mid to late 1990s, which reached as high as 9 
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percent of GDP during 1998.115  The Central Bank of Russia estimated that capital flight 
during 1994-98 averaged $11 billion a year, or approximately $75 per capita.  Other 
estimates of capital flight from Russia range between $10 billion and $20 billion per 
year.116  The discrepancy between the estimates is that the estimates of capital flight are 
limited by the inability to distinguish between legal and illegal capital flows.  Figure 2 
shows how these estimates were calculated.  According to the IMF, Russian authorities 
sought to decrease capital flight through intensification of exchange controls, tightened 
tax administration and financial sector supervision.117 
 
Figure 2.   Estimate of Capital Flight from Russia, 1994-1998 (US $ Billions), (From 
“International Efforts to Aid Russia’s Transition Have Had Mixed Results,” 
Foreign Assistance, November 2000). 
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Effects of Yeltsin’s reforms could also be seen by evaluating Russia’s growth.  
When comparing the growth of Russia to other Central and Eastern European and Baltic 
states, in 1998 Russia’s GDP was estimated at 55 percent of the 1989 level which was 
well below the 95 percent of the other transitional economies.118  Herrera argues that 
endogenous institutional development and avoidance of difficult politics were 
unfortunately part of the neoliberal consensus that contributed to the lack of institutional 
development in Russia, a deficiency that has and will continue to negatively impact 
sustainable growth.119  Unfortunately it would take the financial crisis of 1998 for 
Russia’s corporate sector to address the necessity of institutional reform.  After 1998, 
Russia did start to see positive economic growth, which was attributed to increased oil 
production as illustrated in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Real GDP 1990-2002: Industry, Oil, and Gas (From “Transition to 
Development,” World Bank draft, April 2004, 69) 
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Russia’s continued reliance on oil revenues would continue to play a significant 
role throughout Russia’s transition and is discussed further in Chapter IV. 
The growth of crime and corruption during the 1990s has been the subject of 
debate as to how much privatization was the cause for its rise.  Aslund argues that 
corruption is not related at all to privatization itself but was connected with law 
enforcement, tax collection, and the lack of state intervention.120  Herrera follows along 
similar lines to that of Aslund in that she argues the rise can be attributed to the “lack of 
appropriate regulations and institutions that could have given the state information about 
the economy and made illegal economic activity more costly.”121  It is significant to note 
that neither argued that privatization itself was the root cause of corruption as some 
analysts have argued in the past.  They do however disagree on whether corruption could 
have been prevented.  Aslund’s view follows along the line that the roots of corruption 
can be seen throughout Soviet history, while Herrera argues that the lack of institutional 
reform helped to pave the way for the rise in corruption.  Further discussion with regards 
to the roots of corruption is discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
The final significant effect that could be related to Yeltsin’s reforms impacted the 
social welfare of Russia.  As was stated earlier, the Russian elite comprised of the 
majority of the wealth in the country while 38 percent of the population was living below 
subsistence levels in 1999.122  Income inequality destroyed the sense of fairness in shared 
costs and economic reform.123  It also caused the Russian public to distrust the elites as 
they saw the oligarchs make significant gains while they were left to suffer as a collective 
whole.  An example of this could be found in the health care system, which remained 
under state influence, where it suffered from the same problems it did under communism 
including low salaries, low efficiency, and bribery.124 
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The lack of development of institutional infrastructure had far reaching effects 
that touched nearly everything from efficiency, to investment, to growth, to the rise of 
crime and corruption, and finally impacted the social welfare of the country.  With Putin 
coming to power in 2000, the direction for the Russian economy was to change yet again.  
The effects of these reforms would seriously influence the direction that Putin would take 
the economy and are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
E. ENTER THE NEW ORDER 
 
Russia still has much work to do.  During the 1990’s under Yeltsin, Russia saw 
the rise of the oligarchs that made their fortunes on often-rigged sales of state assets.  
When Putin came to power, the public was hoping that with Putin’s background in the 
KGB he would be quick to crackdown on the oligarchs, and he even gave the public 
some hope that he would eliminate the oligarchs as a class.  In a December 2000 
interview he stated, “In our country representatives of big business who try to influence 
political decision making while staying in the shadows have been regarded as oligarchs.  
There must be no such group of people.”125  His message to the oligarchs was clear; they 
could keep their ill gotten gains as long as they remained out of the political arena.  Putin 
declared economic growth to be a top priority.  During his first term, Putin shifted the 
direction of the economy since its development under Yeltsin.  Putin’s actions in the 
strategic placement of those loyal to him in positions of power within the energy sector 
and his pursuit of Khodorkovsky and Yukos shows the lengths he is willing to go to in 
order to regain control of the oligarchs and is the subject of Chapter IV. 
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IV. ECONOMIC REFORM PART III – THE PUTIN YEARS 
When Vladimir Putin became President he inherited an economic system built on 
corruption, with a weak system to support the rule of law and dominated by a select few 
who acted only to further their own self interests.  Putin’s background is steeped in order 
and the anarchical nature of the Russian state when he took office was the focus of his 
attack as he worked to push economic reforms and regain control of the state.  In his 
address to the Federal Assembly in July of 2000, he stated: 
We must insure that all of us – entrepreneurs, power structures, all citizens 
– strongly feel their responsibility to the country. So that strict fulfillment 
of the law becomes the deliberate choice of all citizens of Russia.  Policies 
built on the basis of open and honest relations of the state with society will 
protect us from repeating past mistakes, and are the basic conditions of a 
new ‘social contract’  Russia needs an economic system which is 
competitive, effective and socially just, which ensures stable political 
development. A stable economy is the main guarantor of a democratic 
society, and the very foundation of a strong nation that is respected in the 
world.  The main obstacles to economic growth are high taxes, corruption 
among officials and extensive crime.  Solving these problems depends on 
the state.  A state prone to corruption, with unclear limits of jurisdiction, 
will not save entrepreneurs from corrupt officials and the influence of 
crime.  An ineffective state is the main reason for the long and deep 
economic crisis – I am absolutely sure of this – and we know well the 
manifestations of this crisis.  It is necessary to learn lessons from our 
experience and admit that the state’s key role in the economy is 
undoubtedly the protection of economic freedom.  Our strategic line is as 
follows: less administration, and more entrepreneurial freedom – freedom 
to produce, trade, and invest.126 
In this statement, Putin indicates to the direction in which he hoped to take the 
country.  He wanted to continue with economic reform and create a Russia that had its 
own identity.  It appeared that in addition to shaping Russia’s identity he wanted to 
strengthen Russia and establish a state that ensured freedom – freedom of personality, 
freedom of enterprise, and freedom of developing institutions of civil societies. 
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Following the address, the West breathed a sigh of relief as it appeared that 
Russia would continue down the path of democracy and market reform.  Putin presented 
an image of order and sobriety, a welcome change to the chaotic temperament of Yeltsin.  
During the first few years of his presidency, the Russian economy would continue to 
grow and various reforms aimed at establishing the rule of law would be implemented.  
Putin’s first years would also see him take some actions toward the oligarchs that initially 
raised some eyebrows.  In the beginning, alarm bells did not go off in the international 
arena – at least not until he jailed the CEO of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.  In the fall 
of 2003, Putin’s motives began to be seriously questioned in Western capitals.  It was 
time for Russia watchers to start asking questions.  They wanted to know if Putin was 
attempting to establish a transparent free-market economy that abides by the rule of law 
or whether he was attempting to control the market through political means.  What would 
be the effects of the establishment or disestablishment of the rule of law in the Russian 
marketplace? 
This chapter examines Putin’s efforts to drive the economy during his first term as 
president of Russia.  It will answer the following questions.  What types of systems were 
in place when Putin became president, and given its constraints, what type of economy is 
Putin capable of creating?  Should we expect more?  Is Putin attempting to establish a 
transparent free-market economy that abides by the rule of law or is he attempting to 
control the market through political means?  In order to answer these questions, I will 
examine the steps that Putin has taken in order to clean up the corrupt economic system, 
and the effects of those decisions.  My argument is that given the nature of the Russian 
economy and the state of its institutions, Putin is doing the best he can given the 
circumstances. 
 
A. PUTIN TAKES CONTROL 
 
When Putin took office he was constrained by the legacy of the past and the 
political and social order that he inherited.127  He immediately picked up the theme of 
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“dictatorship of law,” as a way of “ensuring the rules apply to everyone.”128  After 
having controlled Russia for almost a decade, the oligarchs believed they were 
untouchable.  They were able to sway the vote for Yeltsin in 1996, and when it appeared 
that under Putin they would lose control, they resorted to the media tactics that worked so 
well back in the nineties.129  The main difference was that they were not dealing with 
Yeltsin anymore.  While this thesis focuses on Khodorkovsky and Yukos, it is worth 
mentioning that Khodorkovsky was not the first oligarch to be singled out by Putin.  
Angered by what he considered an attack on the state by the media, specifically by the 
two media barons Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinski, in July 2000, Putin rounded 
up the oligarchs and laid out the ground rules: they could keep their ill-gotten gains as 
long as they henceforth played by the rules and stayed out of politics.130 
Putin worked to regain order by consolidating the state and restoring the vertical 
chain of government authority that had been destroyed under Yeltsin.  “He considered 
critics and the unruly to be enemies of the state, and therefore his enemies, because he 
identified the state with the president – that is, himself.”131  In June of 2001, Gusinski 
openly criticized Putin’s actions through his media outlet Media-Most.  “The myth of 
Putin as president who advocates reforms, democracy, free speech, and so on, is history 
now,” Gusinski said defiantly.  “His real actions unmask him, revealing his true face, you 
know.”132  Gusinski was formally charged on June 16 for nonpayment of debts to the 
state.133  Gusinski was not the only oligarch to owe the state money, but he did violate 
Putin’s system of loyalty and tried to become a political force in his own right.134  The 
Gusinski affair sent two messages to the oligarchs: one, the president was not joking 
around when it came to maintaining political stability, and two, that prosecutor’s office 
                                                 
128Jonas Bernstein, “Party Lines: Dictated by Law, or Nods,” Moscow Times, March 4, 2000. 
129 For a detailed account of the 1996 election see David Hoffman’s The Oligarchs, 325-364. 
130 David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia, (Cambridge: Perseus 
Books Group, 2003), 497. 
131 Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2003), 106. 
132 Hoffman, 479. 
133 Ibid., 481. 
134 Shevtsova, 107. 
40 
would be used as the guard dog of the new regime and no one had immunity anymore.135  
Western media outlets ran Gusinski’s arrest as their lead story.  The Western response in 
general was negative as Western leaders questioned the Kremlin’s motives behind the 
arrest.136 
The Gusinski affair may have made some of the oligarchs nervous, yet it did not 
stop Putin’s next victim from attempting his shot at the president.  Boris Berezovsky had 
been instrumental in grooming Putin for accession to the presidency; perhaps that is why 
he felt the need to step up and challenge Putin’s consolidation of the state. 
Berezovsky came to the conclusion that if Putin was not stopped from 
gathering all power to himself soon, he would leave no room for any 
independent political actors, even those to whom he was obligated.  He 
became the first to openly protest Putin’s reform of the Federation 
Council.137 
In addition to these protestations, Berezovsky wanted to create opposition to 
Putin.  Once again the prosecutor general’s office stepped in and investigated his shady 
deals of the nineties, specifically Aeroflot, which would eventually force him into exile. 
So where do the oligarchs stand?  In June 2000, Gusinski was jailed, released 
after three nights, made for his Sotogrande villa near Kadix in the south of Spain, was 
then charged with embezzlement, and now lives in Tel Aviv, Israel.  Federal prosecutors 
slapped metals magnate Vladimir O. Potanin with a lawsuit challenging the legality of the 
privatization of his Norilsk Nickel company; Vagit Alexperov, president of Lukoil, 
Russia's largest oil company, was charged with tax fraud; and Berezovsky would flee 
arrest for embezzlement in his dealings with Aeroflot, and live in exile in the United 
Kingdom.138  Following the Berezovsky incident, the remaining oligarchs appeared to 
tow the line, in order to avoid scrutiny. 
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Khodorkovsky took an entirely different path than the rest; in 2000, he decided to 
embrace Western-style corporate governance practices.139  He cleaned up Yukos’ 
accounting practices and published fairly transparent reports of its activities (including 
major shareholders).140  Yukos began to emerge as Russia’s shining star to western 
investors as the oil conglomerate paid out dividends for the first time to its shareholders 
in January 2001.141  With Yukos’ star on the rise, what was it about Khodorkovsky and 
Yukos that triggered the investigation that would eventually land Khodorkovsky in jail 
and Yukos auctioned off for a fraction of its net worth? 
There are many theories of what actually triggered the investigation.  The first 
theory is that “Putin ordered the crackdown as part of an election campaign strategy 
based on doing battle with the oligarchs.  This was a tactical decision with guaranteed 
voter appeal calculated to ensure a first round victory for Putin.”142  A second theory 
goes back a few years to when federal security services went after Vladimir Potanin. 
They demanded that he pay the government $140 million for what they called the 
undervalued privatization of Norilsk Nickel.  Rumor has it that they secretly asked for 
money, and that Potanin agreed.  If he had not, some of his people would now be behind 
bars.  Then they went after Yukos, again with their hands out, but Khodorkovsky did not 
pay.143 
The third revolves around Russia’s natural xenophobia, in that Yukos was 
becoming more transparent than Putin was comfortable with.  Yukos at its pinnacle was 
Russia’s top oil producer, pumping 1.7 million barrels of oil a day, or 2 percent of the 
world’s supply.  Yukos pushed Russia to the forefront in 2002 as it became a viable 
alternative to Middle Eastern oil.  Khodorkovsky even met with Condoleezza Rice in 
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Washington to further U.S. interest in Russian oil; he visited Houston for energy summit 
meetings, and he pushed for Russia to start shipping oil to the United States.144  In 
February 2003 Yukos began the process of merging with Russia’s fifth largest oil 
company, Sibneft; a subsequent merger with Exxon Mobil was also being discussed; and 
Khodorkovsky was promoting a new Yukos-built pipeline to China, which would break 
the monopoly of state-owned Transneft Corporation on Russia’s oil exports.145  What 
troubled Putin, at least according to reports in the Russian media, was that a private 
energy giant was making decisions and headlines that were usually reserved for those in 
power behind Kremlin walls.146  Another troubling item for Putin was that should Yukos 
sell off part of its holdings to a Western oil company, it would mean that foreign 
investors would now have a controlling interest in a Russian based firm.  For a country so 
dependent on its oil revenues, this might have been too much for Putin to stomach. 
A fourth theory behind the breakup of Yukos had to deal with Khodorkovsky 
himself.  He became active politically, thereby turning the Kremlin’s focus back to him 
as he broke the fundamental rule of staying out of politics.  Khodorkovsky did not back 
one political party in particular, but generously funded across the political spectrum, 
from the liberal Yabloko to the Communists.  Experts speculated that 
Yukos could end up controlling one third of the seats in the State Duma 
that was to be elected in December 2003.  Yukos was active in buying the 
loyalty of Duma deputies, and did not hesitate to use its leverage to block 
legislation it disliked, such as higher oil excise taxes and revisions to the 
law on production sharing.147 
Yukos was not the only firm to oppose the tax changes that Putin was attempting 
to implement.   
But as Alexei Kudrin, the finance minister, told a Russian magazine, 
Kompania, in February, in the only admission from on high that the case 
was political: ‘Other companies lobbyists did not behave so aggressively.’ 
Yukos’ people, he said, ‘came to me and talked directly about laws that 
didn’t suit them: Alexei Leonidovich, we won’t let you get your decisions 
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through the Duma, no matter what it costs us.’  They meant it.  At a 
reading of the tax bill in June last year, even the Communists, usually no 
friends of the oligarchs, voted against it.  So, Mr. Kudrin said the Yukos 
affair was ‘inevitable, not in the personal sense, but in the sense of a 
clarification of the rules of the game’.148 
If exerting pressure through the Duma was not enough, there was even 
speculation that Khodorkovsky himself would run for president in 2008.   
Khodorkovsky did more than just dabble in the political arena; he became one of 
the driving forces behind attempting to establish a ‘civil society’ in Russia.  He 
established pro-democracy projects through his Open Russia Foundation.  With an annual 
budget of $12 million, the Foundation’s objective was to promote liberal and democratic 
society by supporting the country’s most active and talented citizens who wish to live, 
work and succeed professionally in Russia.  The Foundation supported a range of projects 
in the areas of education and culture, including the sponsorship of young Russians in the 
arts and sciences, the Federation of Internet Education, teacher training, computers for 
schools, and clubs for regional journalists.149  Khodorkovsky’s philanthropic efforts 
could almost equate him as the Russian version of George Soros.150  However, Nataliya 
Veshnyakova, from the Russian Prosecutor Generals Office, argues that the foundation 
was actually a front to illegally divert Yukos assets.151 
Khodorkovsky was more than just Yukos; he was becoming the most influential 
person in Russia next to Putin himself.  He certainly was the wealthiest.  In 2003, in its 
annual ranking of the world’s wealthiest individuals, Forbes Magazine ranked 
Khodorkovsky 26th overall and number one in Russia, with a net worth of over $8 
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billion.152  Khodorkovsky had effectively gained influence throughout almost every 
political and economic arena in Russia.  Perhaps he did not believe that his 
outspokenness and political dabbling would bring the Kremlin down on him or perhaps 
he felt his stature in society gave him some form of immunity, either way the result was 
the same – in October of 2003, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was charged with tax evasion and 
subsequently sent to jail. 
Following Khodorkovsky’s arrest, westerners and investors alike immediately 
began to wonder what Putin was up to.  Putin again met with business leaders and told 
them “the business community could also put some effort into developing a system of 
new social guarantees” and “help support transformations that have now begun in the 
armed forces, the housing and utilities sector, health and education.”153  They could 
contribute in any way to help encourage a civil society, just so long as they stayed away 
from playing political games.  The oligarchs were again quick to support Putin.154  
Foreign investors, economists and scholars were not so quick to let Putin off the hook.  
They questioned his motives for Khodorkovsky’s arrest and his commitment to 
establishing a transparent market economy.  However, not everyone was against Putin’s 
actions.  Nearly two-thirds of Muscovites polled by the respected VTsIOM-A agency 
were skeptical about Kremlin assertions the YUKOS affair was purely a criminal matter 
and saw Khodorkovsky's arrest as political.  However, support for Putin remained high.  
The VTsIOM-A poll said Putin had 73 percent approval among 1,600 Russians polled in 
October of 2003.155  While this was nearly his lowest score during 2003, it was well 
above his rating after he came to power in 2000 promising to enforce the law and end the 
chaos of the 1990s, when the oligarchs, like Khodorkovsky, amassed their vast wealth. 
Another VTsIOM-A poll conducted in 2003 evaluated the general populace’s 
attitude towards the government reviewing the results of the privatizations of the 1990s, 
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showed that 37 percent believed that all property privatized should be returned to the 
state as compared to the 31 percent who believed that the property should be returned to 
the state only in cases where illegality was proved.156  This can be interpreted that the 
Russian public is supportive of the government conducting reviews of the privatizations 
of the 1990s.  However, the same poll showed that 41 percent of the public believed that 
reviews of the 1990s privatizations would harm the political situation in Russia as 
compared to the 48 percent that believed the reviews would help Russia’s economy.157  
In a subsequent poll, conducted in January 2004, when asked if they believed that the 
politicians and oligarchs had unlimited power and were able to whatever they pleased, 86 
percent of those polled said yes, that both the politicians and oligarchs could do whatever 
they pleased.158  This is a change from a poll conducted in August 2001 in which 69 
percent of the public believed that oligarchs hired the state for their own purpose.159  A 
letter from the editor of the Moscow Times summed up the general feeling of the 
populace with regards to the Khodorkovsky affair.  The letter was highly critical of the 
corrupt loans for shares deal and calls the judicial review “a breath of fresh air,” and goes 
further in criticizing the oligarchs themselves saying that they “massively shortchanged 
the state” and “were a step backward rather than forward in the critical task of developing 
a culture with respect for the rule of law, and they generated wholesale popular cynicism 
about Russia’s variant of capitalism.”160  Whether or not the Kremlin’s motives for 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest were completely legitimate in seeking to recover back taxes that 
Yukos owed the state or they were political, one thing is remarkably clear; Putin is 
realigning the political and economic structure of the state. 
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B. PUTIN’S INHERITANCE 
 
In order to better understand Putin’s motives for breaking the oligarchs’ hold on 
Russia, it is important to take a closer look at the economic system that Putin inherited 
and his motivations behind his vertical realignment of the state.  As was stated in the 
previous chapter, during the nineties Russian society had been taken on a roller coaster 
ride of financial highs and lows, including privatization schemes that stripped the average 
citizen of their life savings while a select few were able to amass obscene amounts of 
wealth.  What the previous chapter did not discuss was the extent to which corruption had 
infiltrated Russian society. 
Corruption resided not only at the elite levels, but had worked its way into almost 
every business from the energy giants to the smallest mom-and-pop establishments.  Why 
was corruption so prevalent in the Russian economy?  Two scholars, Stephen Holmes and 
Nina Khrushcheva, offer up cultural explanations for the rampant corruption.  Holmes 
argues on the basis of “cultural legacies,” “habits acquired in the past, which are difficult 
to shake and which purportedly obstruct the successful creation and function of 
democratic and market institutions.  Old habits die hard and mentalities change 
slowly.”161  Khrushcheva delves into the realm of the Russian “national character” and 
looks at the influences that have created the “values that linger from the previous system 
which reinforce the special role of family and friendship relationships for a Russian.”162  
She argues that, “the influence of these factors leaves little hope for a ‘faceless 
bureaucracy’ that would operate without regard to personal preferences and sympathies, 
applying the law and regulations equally to all.”163  But does that mean that Russia by 
nature is more corrupt than other developing states?  This precise question was tackled by 
Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman.  They argue that 
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once one takes into account Russia’s level of economic development, 
federal structure, and lack of exposure until recently to democracy or free 
trade, its level of perceived corruption in the late 1990s is close to what 
one would expect … Russia is not trapped in a quagmire of corruption by 
the ingrained cultural traits of ordinary Russians or by an insurmountable 
historical legacy.  And corruption, by itself, is not a sufficient explanation 
for the country’s failure to grow.  Rather, corruption is a symptom of 
underlying institutional problems.164 
The lack of institutional reform has been one of the underlying themes of this 
thesis and will remain so when discussing the roots of corruption in Russia.  Oliver 
Blanchard, Maxim Boycko, Marek Dabrowski, Rudiger Dornbusch, Richard Layard, and 
Andrei Shleifer, in their book Post-Communist Reform, believed that liberalization did 
not create corruption or the mafia, but that it had existed within communist institutions 
and later flourished in the two-price system where the privileged buy at lower prices and 
sell illegally at high ones.165  They argue that anyone with the power to prevent 
movement of goods can always extract a rent.  But they make the assumption that a 
legislative infrastructure that would enforce the rule of law would be implemented.  
Unfortunately, establishing respect for the rules was not a priority; it was always assumed 
that it would come with time.  Marshall Goldman, in the Piratization of Russia, gives a 
pointed critique of Boycko et al, in that they “took for granted that the existence of 
property rights automatically guaranteed that the state and the society would enforce 
those rights.  This assumed that there was something like the ‘rule of law’ and that the 
state would not be in a condition of near anarchy.”166  They also say that in order for their 
theory to work, there should be “an appropriate institutional structure in place.”167  Yet at 
the beginning of the reform, no form of market or democratic institutions existed.  Even 
Peter Rutland points out “the reformist leaders gave higher priority to avoiding a return to 
the past than building new institutions for the future.  Promoting respect for the law, 
effective regulatory institutions or  a  healthy  civil  society  was  simply  not  on  their  
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agenda.”168  With no one and no institution in place that could effectively enforce the 
rules or garner respect for the law, and with pre-existing institutions that fostered 
corruption minority investors were often faced with locked doors and the average Russian 
citizen was left to fend for themselves. 
An alarming trend started to permeate the Russian economy during the early years 
of the reform.  The court system did not enforce property rights laws.  New business 
owners, instead, resorted to using criminal groups to enforce contracts and provide 
security.169  Rutland quotes Yulia Latynina as she gives a colorful description of how the 
oligarchs used the criminal groups: 
Back in the late 1980s, when the future oligarchs were just getting started 
in a frenzy of dirt and blood, each faced an impossible task: dealing with 
the thugs who walked into their offices, stuck guns to their heads and 
demanded money, without turning into thugs themselves. They solved this 
problem by amassing security forces and privatizing the state along with 
the cops and the prosecutors.  They took care of the thugs and the "red 
directors.  Then, instead of disarming and disbanding their privatized 
police forces, the oligarchs began to battle one another.  They taught the 
prosecutors how to use criminal investigations to pry factories away from 
their owners.  They created Frankenstein, but Frankenstein did not obey 
his master for long.170 
When Khodorkovsky acquired Yukos, he sent three hundred of his security men 
to physically take over the refineries and oil wells.171  He used his security force to 
ensure the company knew who was boss and that he would not tolerate falsifying the 
books from the financial officers or accountants.  This was the only way to ensure that he 
retained control of his new company as there was no other set of institutions that could 
guarantee his property rights. 
Private security forces, and their criminal counterparts, filled the gaping hole that 
the state was not able or willing to fill.  Vadim Volkov offers up what is perhaps the most 
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in depth argument for the origins of Russia’s corruption.  He argues that most theories 
assume the state is present; in Russia, the structural presence of the state was in fact 
absent in the early nineties.  The absence of the state effectively created a new 
competitive market for protection.  The conditions are set by individuals to form 
protective agencies from the bottom-up.  These agencies are made up of individuals who 
were either previously employed in the Soviet security forces, whose jobs were wiped out 
when the power structures of the centralized state were weakened, or youth groups – 
former athletes that were closely linked to the Soviet militia or military.  Volkov 
dismisses the cultural argument that Russia can never change.  He argues that Russia is 
simply going through the natural process of gaining control, first through taxation, 
judicial reform, and law enforcement.172  Shleifer and Treisman argue along the same 
lines as Volkov in that at the stage of Russia’s transformation, administrative corruption, 
organized crime, financial crisis, hyperinflation, and back-room political dealing is 
perfectly normal.173 
Volkov also argues that the criminal groups and protection agencies went through 
the same growth processes that the oligarchs went through, as they initially implemented 
their own form of asset stripping.  In their early stages the groups “were excessively cruel 
and predatory on the businessmen from whom they collected protection money: ‘they are 
completely irrational, they rip off their own businessmen and do not let them 
develop’.”174  They acted as the oligarchs did, preferring short-term gains over sustained 
‘stationary’ protective relationships.  As profits started to dip, they were tempted by 
incentives to go legit.  They looked into investments and enforcement of contracts, and 
through working with the companies they were protecting they were able to increase the 
company’s profits, in turn increasing their own.  The protection agencies found it was 
better to feed off the real economy rather than work against it.  So, as they approached 
protection as a business proposition, they learned to move and flex with the market in 
order to survive.  The protection agencies became rational actors behaving in a rational 
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way in response to economic factors.  These protection agencies became Russia’s answer 
to dealing with the need to protect property rights and the basis for a shadowy system of 
arbitration.175 
 
C. PUTIN’S POLICIES 
 
This system of corruption and privatized enforcement of property rights is what 
Putin inherited and what he vowed to clean up in his July 2000 Address to the Federal 
Assembly.  He immediately put the wheels in motion to regain control of the state, first in 
his conference with the oligarchs laying out the new ground rules, second by 
implementing new tax reforms to encourage businesses and individuals to pay their taxes, 
and finally by strategically placing those loyal to him in various power positions within 
the government and the economy.  The new ground rules have already been discussed at 
length as well as the impact of violating those rules. 
Putin’s second action dealing with tax reforms included the implementation of a 
13 percent flat tax on income.  The lower marginal tax rates produced higher revenues as 
both new and previously concealed economic activities entered the tax base.  In 
November of 2002, it was reported that the revenues generated were equal to roughly 16 
percent of Russia’s GDP.176   "There was a huge, monstrous non-compliance problem 
with the old system," says Dr. Richard Vedder, an Ohio University economics professor.  
Dr Vedder stated that a lot of people tended to use payment in kind rather than cash for 
goods in order to evade having to pay taxes.  “That problem, from what I understand, has 
not totally disappeared but has dramatically declined in the last year or two.”177 
Putin’s third action and perhaps his most controversial was that of placing those 
people loyal to him in positions of power.  The Institute of Sociology of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences conducted research on the Putin elite during the years of 2001-
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2003.  The result of the study shows that the staffs of the presidential envoys in the seven 
federal districts have “experienced the most precipitous invasion of military personnel 
(up to 70 percent of the total).”178  It finds that “serious changes have occurred at the 
regional level as well.  The number of people with a military or security background has 
more than doubled over the past three years.  35 percent of those working in economic 
ministries have a military or security background.”179  The study reveals the curious fact 
that during the first three years of Putin’s presidency the elite has become more 
militarized and less intellectual.180 
Putin’s realignment of power was something that he had envisioned long before 
he was elected president.  When Putin was appointed as the first deputy to the chief of the 
presidential administration, he was placed in a position in which he had direct contact 
with the regional governors.  In an interview Putin spoke of his interactions with the 
governors and gave what could be considered a prophetic statement: “Everyone was 
saying that the vertical, the vertical chain of government, had been destroyed and that it 
had to be restored.”  When asked if the governors were ready to line up under the 
vertical, Putin replied “they are.  After all, the governors are part of the country, and they 
also suffer from management weaknesses.  Not everyone is going to like everything.  
You can’t please everybody, but you can find some common approaches.”181  So, Putin 
worked to consolidate power by placing fellow Saint Petersburgers in positions of 
loyalty.  Shevtsova argues that Putin was following his gut instinct and implemented a 
system of subordination.  “His instincts, honed in the power structures, provided simple 
guidance: control everything, trust no one, be strong because power is the only thing 
people understand.”182  In order to build his vision, he started with the power ministries 
to appoint men loyal to him.  Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Ivanov, Putin’s 
closest ally, was named minister of defense.  Boris Gryzlov, the leader of the Unity 
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faction and also Putin’s man, became the new minister of the interior.183  Putin did want 
to continue to push for market reforms, so he brought economic liberals into the 
government.  They were German Gref, Andrei Illarionov, and Alexei Kudrin, all men he 
knew from Saint Petersburg.  He then turned to state-owned industries intending to gain 
control of the monopolies.  His first target was Gazprom.  He replaced Rem Vyakhirev 
with his own man from Saint Petersburg, Alexei Miller.184  Anatoly Chubias was a part 
of Yeltsin’s reform party and he headed RAO UES, the Russian electric utility.  When 
Putin came after RAO UES, Chubias pushed back by drawing up a reform draft for the 
utility.185  After some debate, Chubias remained head of RAO UES; his being a fellow 
Saint Petersburger probably did not hurt.186  However, the recent power outage in 
Moscow has placed Chubias in the spotlight.  The Vremya novostei on 27 May noted that 
Chubias is “the last director of a fundamental state natural monopoly who is not a man of 
Putin’s team,” and speculated “that the goal of the criminal prosecution of the case could 
be to enable Moscow municipal authorities to take over Mosenergo or to form a rival 
concern.”187 
In addition to the various appointments, Putin moved to gain control of the larger 
private energy companies by pressuring the remaining oligarchs to join the Russian 
Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists (RUEI).  With Arkady Volsky, Anatoly 
Chubias, Vladimir Potanin, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky all incorporated into the RUEI, 
Putin had achieved his goal of getting all the industrialists and oligarchs in one place and 
under his control, without having to renationalize the privately owned companies.188  
Loyalty was the main issue for Putin.  He used the very simplistic method of dividing 
everyone into two groups; those that were loyal and those that were not.  Gusinski, 
Berezovsky, and Khodorkovsky are all examples of what would happen should this 
system of loyalty be violated.  Companies that currently fall in line with Putin include 
                                                 
183 Shevtsova, 177. 
184 Ibid., 188. 
185 Ibid., 189. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Quoted in “Newspapers Speculate on the Political Fallout from the Blackout,” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL newsline, vol., 9, no., 101, part 1, 27 May 2005. 
188 Shevtsova., 180. 
53 
Rosneft, which is state-owned; TNKBP, whose CEO is Simon Kukes and a Putin loyalist 
with no privatization scandals in his background; and Lukoil’s CEO, Alekperov, is loyal 
to the authorities. 
 
D. EFFECTS OF PUTIN’S ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
Putin’s economic policies, from the time he took office through 2003, focused on 
establishing political and economic institutions that would stabilize the Russian economy.  
This entailed creating some of the fundamental institutions of a market economy to 
include civil, tax, budget, labor and land codes, and pension law.  Putin’s government 
also lifted administrative barriers to the entrepreneurial activity, improved the 
relationship between the federal, regional and local budgets, and approached the natural 
monopolist’s reform.189  The implementation of these reforms furthered Russia’s 
progress in economic reform and helped to secure its economic growth.  By 2004, GDP 
had increased by 7.1 percent, having grown from 10 percent in 2000, 5 percent in 2001, 
4.3 percent in 2002, and 7.3 percent in 2003.190  Much of the growth in GDP can be 
attributed to higher oil prices which averaged $27 a barrel in 2003, hit a high of $48 per 
barrel in 2004, and led to a budgetary surplus of R70 billion.191  On paper, the numbers 
show Russia to be well on its way to developing into a stable market economy.  
Unfortunately, once one looks beneath the surface several problems can be seen. 
The first problem is that Russia has emerged as a petrol-state and is dangerously 
dependent on oil and natural gas exports and is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations to 
world oil prices. 
A $1 per barrel change in oil prices will result in a $1.4 billion change in 
Russian revenues in the same direction—a fact that underlines the 
influence of oil on Russia's fiscal position and its vulnerability to oil 
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market volatility.  The government's stabilization fund, a rainy-day storage 
facility for windfall oil receipts that came into effect on January 1, 2004, 
can help to offset oil market volatility.  But as the fund grows (it is 
currently worth approximately $16.7 billion), using it to solve social 
problems or to buy other assets in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) may become more likely.  Although estimates vary widely, 
the World Bank has suggested that Russia's oil and gas sector may have 
accounted for up to 25% of GDP in 2003 while employing less than 1% of 
the population.  Raw materials, such as oil, natural gas, and metals, 
dominate exports and account for over two-thirds of all Russian export 
revenues.192 
Related to Russia’s dependence on oil as identified in 2001, by Putin’s economic 
advisor Andrei Illarionov, was that Russia was showing early signs of “Dutch 
disease.”193  Rutland argues that two sets of prices in the Russian economy are out of 
line: the price of the ruble itself (the exchange rate) and the price of energy.  With regards 
to the ruble, “for reasons of inertia and prestige, the government chooses to try and 
maintain a relatively fixed nominal ruble exchange rate against the dollar.”194  By fixing 
the ruble to the dollar and not allowing its value to fluctuate, higher inflation and import 
competition leading to an erosion of trade surplus can result in investor flight.  This was 
precisely the chain of events that happened in the banking crisis of August 1998.195  The 
volatile nature of rising inflation and the strengthening ruble are not the biggest problems 
relating to economic stability.  William Tompson, senior economist at the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation & Development in Paris, argues that more serious problem is 
that natural resources generate large “rents,” easy money that fuels corruption and state 
interference in the economy, as well as often sparking serious political strife among rival 
interest groups.  Rents can have serious long-term effects on a country's social 
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institutions and its political stability.  Tompson calls the “resource curse” which “has 
more to do with politics than anything else.”196 
A second problem is that Russia’s transition to a viable market economy is still 
hindered by significant amount of capital flight and questions surrounding property rights 
have not been answered.197  In 2000, while Russia earned approximately $20 billion from 
the world markets on oil exports, roughly the same amount in capital left Russia.198  
According to Russia's central bank, net capital flight was more than four times higher in 
2004 than the year before, at $9.4 billion.199  A monthly poll conducted by the 
Association of Managers of Russia, in January 2005, revealed the following distribution 
of answers to the question of the reasons for capital outflow from Russia in 2004: 47% – 
poor protection of ownership rights, 38.6% – the YUKOS case, 14.5% – search for new 
investment objects, 1.2% – U.S. dollar fall, 1.2% – the summer 2004 banking crisis.200  
The poll reveals that Russians unwillingness to invest in their own economy stems 
primarily from the continued “uncertainty over property rights – a fear that capital 
investments will be seized by the state, or by other private actors operating through the 
corrupt legal system.”201  As illustrated in Figure 4 below, foreign investment in Russia 
almost equals domestic investment out of Russia. 
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Figure 4.   Foreign investment in Russia and Russia’s investment abroad in 1999 through 
2004 (From “Russian Economy: Trends and Perspectives,” The Institute for the 
Economy in Transition, March 2005). 
 
In 2003, foreign investment amounted to 18 percent of GDP; about half of what 
Russia needs to overhaul its 30 year old industrial infrastructure.202  While Putin has paid 
lip service to attracting FDI, he has done little to pacify concerns surrounding property 
rights.  These concerns were only amplified in the fall of 2003 when the Kremlin went 
after Yukos and jailed Khodorkovsky for tax evasion and fraud, leaving investors 
wondering if Putin was planning a wholesale revision of the privatization of the 1990s.203  
In July 2004, the government confiscated Yukos as payment for its huge tax bill, and 
subsequently sold it in December to little known BaikalFinansGroup (BFG) for $9.3 
billion.  BFG was then absorbed by state-owned Rosneft.204  The sale of Yukos was 
criticized heavily by presidential economic advisor Andrei Illarionov as he called it “the 
swindle of the year.”205  Putin tried to reassure both Russian and Western businessmen 
through several meetings and radio addresses by saying: 
The main thing, and what we should not forget as we introduce these 
changes, is that the oil and the fuel and energy sectors are like the goose 
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that lays the golden eggs, and it would be stupid, unreasonable and 
unacceptable to kill the goose. But don’t worry, this will not happen.206  
Despite these reassurances, negative attitudes persisted from liberals and some 
senior government executives as they believed the Yukos transaction was in violation of 
ownership rights, created an unfavorable investment environment, collapsed confidence 
in the government, and effectively moved the government towards an autocratic 
regime.207  Initially it appeared to investors that what happened to Yukos was no more 
than a political brawl between Khodorkovsky and the Kremlin; but when the justice 
ministry seized Yukos, some interpreted this as the government redistributing the 
property and putting the control of the oil industry into trusted hands.208  The ‘trusted 
hands’ were those of Igor Sechin, who was appointed as chairman of Rosneft in July of 
2004, and who would later position Rosneft to purchase Yukos in December.209  The 
message from the Kremlin to investors appeared to be that what really matters is control 
over cash flow rather ownership and that for investment in the energy sector to move 
forward, interested companies will have to deal with the Kremlin directly.210 
One thing remains clear, no matter how murky the water gets, Western oil 
companies are still willing to pursue deals in Russia.  This is in part due to increased 
demand for oil from not only the United States but from China and Japan as well.  It is 
also due to the fact Russia ranks second to Saudi Arabia when it comes to oil production 
and is considered a viable alternative to Middle Eastern oil.  Examples of joint ventures 
in 2004 alone include:  BP, which currently has the largest joint venture with TNK at $8 
billion; Chevron Texaco looked to invest with Sibneft along with Total; Conoco Phillips 
is looking at expanding its relationship with Lukoil; and Royal Dutch/ Shell has the 
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largest single direct investment in Russia’s Sakhalin region.211  Oil, however, is not the 
only place that investors are willing to put their money; Russia’s antiquated phone system 
has been highlighted as a possible opportunity for growth and two of its wireless firms, 
Vimpel Communications and Mobile Telesystems, are being traded in the United 
States.212 
While interest in the oil sector remains high, other sectors are lagging and new 
government actions can only serve to discourage investment.  The government seems to 
be in an internal battle of how much foreign investment it is willing to allow.  During 
2003 and 2004, the government promoted new legislation that would weaken minority 
shareholder rights, launched an investigation into foreign investments into Gazprom, and 
has shrugged off entreaties from Washington to broaden its energy relationship with the 
United States, in light of the rise in oil prices and feared instability in the international 
economy.213  Since the government seized Yukos, several non-energy sector deals have 
suffered:  Alcoa Inc. and Siemens AG had plans to buy separate facilities in Russia.  
These have been held up by the government’s anti-monopoly agency.  Cargill Inc. has 
encountered problems reclassifying land for a Russia-based project; and Exxon Mobile 
had its license for a project on Sakhalin Island stripped away.214  The government is 
keenly aware that these issues make investment in Russia less attractive and it is 
attempting to solve its problems with regards to weak institutions, poorly defined and 
enforced property rights, and violations of minority shareholders’ rights.  Yet until 
sufficient progress has been made towards solving its problems and becomes visible to 
potential investors, confidence will remain relatively low and investment risks will 
remain high in Russia.215 
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Putin has seen some success through continued growth in annual GDP.  Since 
taking the reins in 2000, Russia has seen an average 6.5 percent growth in GDP from 
2000-2003.216  Most of which can be attributed to high oil prices.  If Putin truly wants to 
strengthen Russia’s economy he will need to commit to strengthening other economic 
sectors – especially transportation, information technology, telecommunications and 
agriculture – rather than relying solely on energy exports. 
                                                 


























Russia should be and will be a country with a developed civil society and 
stable democracy.  Russia will guarantee full human rights, civil liberties, 
and political freedom.  Russia should be and will be a country with a 
competitive market economy, a country where property rights are reliably 
protected and where economic freedom makes it possible for people to 
work honestly and to earn without fear or restriction.  Russia will be a 
strong country with modern, well equipped and mobile armed forces, with 
an army ready to defend Russia and its allies and the national interests of 
the country and of its citizens.  All this will and should create worthy 
living conditions for people and will make it possible to be an equal in the 
society of the most developed states.  And people can not only be proud of 
such a country – they will multiply its wealth, will remember and respect 
our great history.  This is our strategic goal.217 
Vladimir Putin 
The purpose of this thesis has been to explore trends of Russian economic reform 
specifically as they related to the direction that Putin is attempting to drive the Russian 
economy.  The evaluation of these trends began with the Gorbachev era starting with 
glasnost and perestroika, as that is where the seeds of reform were planted.  The 
Gorbachev era provided the baseline for understanding the need for reform to the Soviet 
system.  It also showed that Gorbachev’s reforms, though radical by Soviet standards, 
were not revolutionary.  The reforms did, however, open the door for ‘new thinkers’ to 
push towards developing a market economy and democratization. 
The Yeltsin era of the 1990s found Russia faced with essentially building a 
market economy from the ground up.  This thesis argued that the reformers took a 
simplistic view of establishing a market economy, as they relied on several assumptions 
that would later prove to have a serious impact on the development of the economy.  
These assumptions included the belief that economic institutional reform would just 
‘happen’ as a result of developing a market and that Russian investors would behave the 
same as their Western counterparts.  Neither assumption proved to be true, as the lack of 
institutional infrastructure impacted everything from efficiency, to investment, to growth, 
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to the rise of crime and corruption, and the social welfare of the country.  On the investor 
side, Russian investors proved to be easily manipulated by claims of instant wealth and 
many suffered extreme financial losses.  Some good did come out of the reform efforts.  
As Russia moved through its painful transition it was able to stabilize its currency and 
develop a balanced budget, as well as accomplish the mass privatization that moved 
Russia towards becoming a market economy. 218 
When Putin took office he was clear in his intention to keep Russia on the road of 
economic reform.  He immediately worked to create fundamental institutions that were 
missing including civil, tax, budget, labor, land codes, and pension law.  The government 
took strides in deregulation, improved interbudgetary relations, and progressed further 
towards accession to the WTO.219  In the beginning, it appeared that Putin was 
attempting to create a ‘managed democracy;’ however, his actions revealed that he is 
moving the country towards ‘managed capitalism.’  He effectively launched an attack on 
corruption by regaining control of the state through suppression of the oligarchs’ 
influence in political matters, the implementation of new tax reforms on businesses, and 
the strategic placement of those loyal to him in power positions of the government and 
the economy.  His actions did have a negative impact on the economy, specifically when 
the government went after Khodorkovsky and Yukos in 2003, the result was a significant 
decrease in FDI and increase in capital flight.  Although the energy sector has proven to 
be quite resilient and still able to attract FDI, Putin’s actions still leave investors 
concerned and wary as to how much they trust that their interests will be protected. 
 
A. A LOOK AHEAD 
 
Over the last five years Russia has seen a steady growth in GDP, most of which 
can be attributed to oil production; tentative figures show that growth for 2004 was 
approximately 7.1 percent.  For 2005, Russia should expect to see a realistic rise in GDP 
at a rate of 5.8-6.0 percent, even though the current budget is projecting a growth rate of 
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6.3 percent.220  The reason for the small discrepancy is due to the drop in oil prices over 
the past few months.  Currently Russia’s oil reserves rank eighth in the world and second 
behind Saudi Arabia in production.221  As the demand for oil from the United States and 
China continues to increase, investors are looking to expand the Russian oil market as 
alternatives to Middle Eastern oil are explored.  With Putin’s restructuring and oil prices 
on the rise, Russia can expect to see continued growth in the future.  Russia did receive 
some good news in February 2005, when Standard & Poor one of the most conservative 
rating agencies, gave Russia a ”B–“ with a “stable” forecast (with the proviso, however, 
that political decisions and actions of regulatory agencies are unpredictable), which 
provides for investments from long-term conservative investors.222  However, Putin will 
need to invest in developing other economic avenues and market institutions in order for 
Russia to draw the capital into the country it so desperately needs to develop a stable and 
viable market economy. 
As Putin moves into his second term he has put forth several tasks and goals that 
he would like to see accomplished, including the doubling of Russia’s annual GDP by 
2010.  In his annual State of the Nation address he laid out the goals of a stable 
democracy and developed civil society, the strengthening of Russia's international 
positions, and the substantial growth in the well-being of Russia’s citizens.223  In addition 
to doubling GDP he also emphasized the following tasks of reducing poverty, improving 
people's prosperity, and restructuring the army.224  Putin is relying primarily on high oil 
prices for Russia to reach its goal of doubling its GDP by 2010.  He has also asked 
officials to reduce inflation from its current 10 percent to 3 percent, and also asked for 
more tax reform to help lure investors from Russia’s competitors.  In his address, Putin 
appears to reassure critics that there will not be another Yukos (although he did not 
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mention it specifically) as he has asked the tax authorities to put a statue of limitations of 
three years for investigations into tax fraud.  He also called for continued reform in the 
protection of property rights.  While he did not mention establishing a credible rule of 
law, he did mention “rules to which the state adheres in this sphere should be clear to 
everyone, and, importantly, these rules should be stable.”225  It is interesting to note that 
with regards to FDI, Putin urged officials to draft a system of criteria to determine the 
limitations on foreign participation in specific sectors of the economy.  Most of the 
limitations would be in the energy sector where it appears that Putin wants to maintain a 
direct influence.  While Putin apparently intends to keep tight controls on investment 
within the energy sector he does want to “create favorable conditions for the inflow of 
private capital to all the other attractive sectors.”226  Finally and perhaps most 
importantly, Putin asks that Russians keep the flow of capital in Russia, by paying their 
13 percent tax on income and depositing the rest in banks as “this money should work in 
our economy, in our country, not lie in offshore zones.”227 
Can the Kremlin ‘have its cake and eat it too?’  In a private meeting with Putin, 
Economic Minister German Gref reportedly told Putin that it could not, as sustained 
economic growth was being hindered by too much state intervention.228  Over the past 
several weeks, since Putin gave his address and the reading of the Khodorkovsky verdict 
began, there has been a lot of speculation with regards to what Putin wants and the path 
that he is taking with the economy.  Peter Lavelle argues that it is not hard to perceive 
Putin as “authoritarian.”  “In most ways he is.  Given Russia's current development 
trajectory, Putin probably has to be.”229  Lavelle believes that Russia is at an extremely 
important juncture.  Either the Kremlin continues its very hard-handed approach to 
restructuring and reforming the economy or it risks international concerns that Russia 
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will revert to an “Upper Volta with nuclear weapons.”230  In the past Putin has made it 
clear that he does not intend to turn back the clock.  Putin’s actions can be interpreted as 
‘necessary’ to get a handle on Russia’s rampant corruption and if he intends to 
accomplish the goals he set forth in his State of the Nation address. 
There is constant debate in the media about how much the Yukos case has 
influenced investment in Russia.  Some experts claim that it really has not had an effect, 
while others claim that the effect is seen in the rate of capital outflow out of the country.  
The United States is keeping a close eye on the Yukos case, not to gauge investment 
levels but to determine the state of the rule of law within Russia.  Even the Duma sees the 
trial as a litmus test for where Russia stands with regards to the judiciary.  Another 
organization that is monitoring the case is the WTO, as Russia hopes to someday become 
a member.  The West in general, the United State in particular, has been consistently 
critical of how Russia has handled the Yukos case as a whole and continues to voice its 
concerns, especially when it appears that Putin is moving away from establishing a 
democracy with a transparent market economy.  Many experts continue to question 
Putin’s motives and actions.  Some have even gone so far as to suggest that Putin will 
change the Russian constitution so that he may continue to serve as president.  Most of 
this is all speculation and beyond the scope of this thesis.  It can be concluded that Putin 
inherited a system in which he was constrained by the legacy of the past and he has taken 
the necessary actions to counter corruption and has kept Russia on the path of economic 
reform through ‘managed capitalism.’ 
However, Putin could have done more.  Some of the most basic economic 
institutions remain weak at best, the most significant deficiencies lie in the establishment 
of the rule of law which protects property rights.  The judiciary is still under the influence 
of the Kremlin, despite words to the contrary.  For example, the government continues to 
influence the proceedings of Khodorkovsky case; Khodorkovsky was held for almost a 
year before his trial got underway; and the media reported that the court was ordered 
from “higher up” to speed up the reading of the verdict.231  Also, Putin’s actions with 
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regards to the Yukos case may be interpreted as politically motivated and undermines 
Russia’s efforts at becoming a transparent market economy.  The next few years will 
prove to be a turning point for Russia as it approaches the 2008 election.  Will Russia 
make a successful transition in 2008?  Can Russia maintain its current level of economic 
growth?  Will Russia be able to recover from the effects of ‘Dutch disease?’  Only time 
can answer these questions. 
 
B. THE YUKOS VERDICT 
 
On May 16, 2005, Judge Irina Kolesnikova began reading the five inch thick, over 
1,000 page verdict, which is more than simply a reading of guilt or acquittal but a long 
laborious reading of summations from the prosecution and defense as well as judiciary 
comments.  On May 31, 2005 Khodorkovsky was convicted guilty on six of the seven 
counts of fraud and tax evasion, and was sentenced to nine years in prison.232  
Prosecutors had wanted the maximum of ten years per count.233  The decision 
immediately sparked more speculation about investment climate and the state of the rule 
of law within Russia.  Although a guilty verdict was expected, the verdict prompted 
President Bush to openly criticize the Russian judicial system by stating “that it seemed 
that Khodorkovsky had been adjudged guilty prior to having a fair trial.”234 
In an interview with Neil Buckley from the Financial Times, Anders Aslund 
spoke to what many experts believe to be true by stating “I don't think that Putin can 
afford another Yukos, but on the other hand, you could say that the bureaucracy is out of 
control.”235  An out of control bureaucracy is as equally dangerous to the Russian 
economy as is another Yukos case for establishing rule of law should it act for political 
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vice legal reasons.  If the government continues to move against private enterprise for 
political reasons it will only undermine the efforts to develop the institutions necessary to 
protect property rights as well as develop a transparent market economy. 
However, the question of “will there be another Yukos” remains.  Recent moves 
against some companies would suggest yes.  VimpelCom, the mobile phone operator, 
was hit with a $158m (Euros 120m, Pounds 83m) back-tax bill in December 2004. The 
tax authorities later quietly lowered this to $18m, apparently after high-level government 
intervention.  In April 2005 TNK-BP, the oil joint venture that is Russia's biggest foreign 
investment, saw a back-tax demand for 2001 raised sevenfold to nearly $1bn.236  These 
actions do not bode well to foster an investment friendly economic environment.  Instead 
they only serve to keep investors guessing as to whether or not Putin is serious about 
creating a viable transparent market economy. 
Putin apparently does believe in developing a market economy, just not in the 
sense that westerners have envisioned, but rather that of a state-controlled market 
economy.  The dominant trends over the past four years, as argued by Alexander 
Radygin, an economist at the Institute for the Economy in Transition, “have been the 
growing expansion of property interests of the Russian state, an attempt to establish 
control over capital flows in the Russian economy, and a desire to make business 
dependent on state institutions.”237  Given the hurdles that Putin has had to leap in order 
to get a handle on corruption, it is not surprising that Putin has elected to move toward 
greater state control over the economy and the state itself.  However, state-control does 
not resolve the fundamental problem of institutional development and reform.  Putin has 
essentially paid lip service to the establishment and enforcement of institutions of 
transparency, accountability, and property rights.  He has pushed for solid land and labor 
laws and tax and budget codes, but it is not enough.  He needs to step up his efforts to 
develop those institutions that are still very weak, including strengthening the judiciary 
and those government agencies that ensure that the law is applied equally and effectively.  
Only then will Russia achieve its goal of developing a transparent market economy.   
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